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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The development ot the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States ColfJSitMtiQD is a significant area of constitutional 
growth. This study tocuses on the recent landmark decision, 
Robi.nson v. Oalitorniat J?O u.s. 660(1962) 1 and subsequent re-
actions in federal and state courts to that decision. Th• case 
has been the vehicle tor the extenaion of the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against c:euel and unusual punishment to the states 
thJtough the due prooess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The tacts of the case illustrated judicial reaetion to 
the social phenomenon of growing drug addiction in the United 
States. However, the principle that state laws punishing status 
alone were unconstitutional has been extended beyond addiction. 
Through this investigation, the process of interaction 
and adaptation Within the United States legal and constitutional 
system has been oba.rved. The method used has been largely case 
analysis. 
This is also a study of the scope and impact of the 
Btlli.uan decision in lower federal court cases and a representa-
tive sample of state cases. 
1 
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First, the i1hin1s>n case has been traced from its begin-
ning in 1960, in the California state and tederal courts to its 
1962 decision in the United States Supreme Court. Then, the cases 
which cited RQb:tJ&an were compared for the years between 1962 and 
1970. 
Between 1962 and 19701 there were 349 total cases in the 
United States court systems which cited the preoldent ot BAD1D§.OD• 
Ot those oases, 266 were decided in the state courts. In the 
federal district and circuit court system, 83 cases were decided. 
Through studying the 83 federal eases, tendencies about 
the scope and 1.mpa.ot ot BA~1DIPA have been not4ld. Atter the ten-
dencies of the precedent in the federal cases had b"n recognized, 
a selected sample of 21 cases from the state court system was 
made. Since these cases followed the same tendencies, the scheme 
ot the 83 federal cases has been assumed to be charactenstic ot 
the universe ot 349 cases which cited lgbiD&U>D• 
Concerning the scope of the decisions, two major trends 
have beens ( 1) application ot the principle of Br.a'92.1191h the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, 
to orimes of status1 and, (2) interpretation ot the detision as an 
extension of the doctrine ot incorporation, or state's rights. 
Regarding the first trend, application ot the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to 
Ori.mes ot status, the eases have been divided into six categories. 
These aret (1) narcotic addict1 (2) alcoholic; (3) vagrant1 (4) 
hippie; (5) mentally illJ and1 (6) sex offender. 
3 
Second• the extension of the Eighth Amendment to the 
states through the due process clause ot the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been found in cases which have ineluded the three phrases of 
the Eighth Amendment• (a) prohibition against denial ot bail; (b) 
prohibition aga1net levJing of excessive tines; and• (c) prohibi• 
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. 
Besides crimes of .status, which have bffn grouped separ-
ately in the paper, the third classification of prohibitions has 
been li.nked to criminal sentences. Especd.ally the death penalty 
has been cited. Also, prohibition agnnst unfair procedul"es in 
prisons and racially-motivated puniahmant ot conVicted persons 
.. 
have been said to be within the meaning ot Bsa'Q1.u.tn• 
Concerning the impact of lg~i;sg;, the results of the 
federal and state cases have been critical reaction to the prin-
oiple of not punishing status. Through subtle interpretations of 
th• holding in the Supreme Court decision, l<>wer tedenl and 
state Qourts have circumvented the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.. Because of the iavolved 
reasoiU.ng to achieve the holding in the Supreme Court opinion, 
later courts have been able to extract many d1tferent procedures 
tor settling issues based on laws which punish crimes ot status. 
Supplementing the case analyses determining the scope and 
impact of BAR~IRDt preparation for the study has included collec-
tion of data about the tradition ot punishment for crimes of 
status. This information has been drawn from anthropologi.cal, 
philosophical and sociological sources as well as legal ones. 
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Attention has been paid to law review articles and notes, 
also. liowever1 appraisals ot the history ot the Eighth Amendment 
and of the tuture importance of the Rg];liQCiQD decision have been 
lacking in that literature. 
Consequently, in this study, which has been baaed on 
actual decision-making withi.n the legal pl"Ocess. speculative 
journalism about possible, alternative reasoning in the Supreme 
Court opinion has not been p•rtinent. Also, atto~neys• theories 
about !orms of treatment tor persons conVicted of crimes ot status 
have not been relevant i.n t.Paoing the development and application 
ot the prine1ple of not punishing cruelly or unumiallY• 
Inetead.1 the pri.ma:117 goal ot this paper has been to estab-
lish trends about this new interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Sine~ its application to the states through the case ot Robinson 
v. California, 370 u.s. 660(1962), the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment has been reconsidered and enlB.l."'pd; 
although, it has not been accepted completely. It is the para-
meters of scope and impact within which the Eighth Amendment has 
been reasserted that have been described. 
II 
ROBINSON v~ CALIFORNIA, 370 U.S. 660(1962) 
Thi ga11tQEmaa St!1it Gd F.ls&1taJ.,CQYJ(ts 
The begi.nning ot the Robinson v. Ca.litornia, 370 u.s. 660 
(1962), landmark Supreme Court decision occurred in the trial 
court ot the Cit7 of Loa Angel•a, Los Angeles County, ot the State 
ot Calitonia. On J\U'l8 91 1960, after one day ot bearings, a jury 
' 
ot twelve returned a verdict of guilty ot narcotic addiction. 1 
Having been anaigned February 4, 1960, tor violation ot 
Section 11721 ot the State Health and Safety Code, 2 a misdemeanor, 
1
•cierk•s Transcript• Doek•t Entries," Transcript ot 
Record. lln~itf St1t11 Rl&Kt.H ctVJ!t B:Ji1.C1 amt Butdl1 ;,zo Ile§• 
g6QCJ962l; P• • . 
2The statute was: ••No person shall use, or be under the 
infiuence ot, or be addicted to the use ot narcotics, excepting 
when administered by or under the direction of a person lioensed 
by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be 
the burden of the defense te show that it comes within the excep-
tion. Any person convicted ot violating any provision of this 
section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall b• sentenced to serve 
a term ot not less than 90 ~s nor more than one 7ear in the 
county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on 
probation for a period not to exceed five years and shall in all 
cases in whioh probation is {P:'anted require as a condition thereof 
that such a person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 
days. In no event does the court have the power to absolve a 
person who violates this section from the obligation of spending 
at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail." Robinson v. 
California, 370 u.s. 661(1962). 
5 
6 
Lawrence Robinson was not sentenced• but placed on probation tor 
two years With the f'irat 90 days of that time to be served in the 
county jail.3 Also, he was to take a Nalline test4 whenever his 
probation officer requested.a to work; to obey the law; and, to be 
under the general superv!Gion of the probation officer and the 
co~t.5 
Then, on June 271 19601 an appeal t1t0m the Municipal Court 
ot the Los Angeles Jud1e1al District ot the City of Los Angeles 
was tiled. in th• Appellate De~tment of the Superior Court ot 
ca11tornia in the City of Loa Angeles. 6 However, the revie'Wi.ng 
court. the highest state eourt having jurisdiction, affirmed the 
earlier conViction of the trial oourt. 
!he brief tor the appeal to the Superior CoUl't stated that 
the ordinance under which Lawrence Robinson had been eonv1cted, 
Section 1l?Z1 ot the cal.1torn1a Health and Safety Code, was uncon-
stitutional, The first of ten reasons given tor the unconstitu-
tionality was that, in addition to being ••vague, indetinite and 
3uuta §t1tu §m»:nt Glurt ~ta arua Rmfia, P• 6. 
4if ai11ne is the phamaoologiea.l trademark to:zi "nalorphine•• • 
which is used to nullify resyiratory depression du• to narcotics 
and tor diagnosis ot addiction to narcotics. Jess Stein, ed. 
~ot,.BPuuat1'1Qft:U gft~t•,k&l:t.ft J.;Anaaa, unabridged Edition 
n orkt om use 1 9 'l , P• 9 9. 
5va&Jcd st1'u s;snin• stam It&•(• .au •111d•1 P• 6 • 
• 6tQ:t.i• • P• 9• 
7 
uncertain1 "7 the ordinance denied Robinson•s "rights to Equa.1 Pro-
tection and to Due Process under the federal and state eonstitu-
tions. n8 
The second reason alleged that eVidenee gained ·oy an nun-
reasonable search and seizure and selt•incJ'1mination••9 had intlu-
enoed the decision and had been "admitted over the detendant•s 
objections by the trial eourt.n10 
The thil'd point was that the "court miadir•eted the jury 
in matters of law.n11 
The fourth said "aeveral causes ot action are improperly 
joined 1n a 81.ngle oount.•12 
The titth wae that "the court erred in tailing to submit 
the factual question re probable ea.use to the jury.*'1' 
The sixth charged. that the court had been in erMr by 
assisting the City Attorney to prepare tor th• expert t••ttmony. 
The seventh repeated that admissions and oonle""'1ons which 
had not been voluntaJ'Y w.re used in the trial, 
The eighth said that '*the verdict and judgment were con-
trary to law and to the ertdenoe."14 
The ninth called the use by the ju17 of a magnifying glass 
to view evidence in photographs an error. 
The tenth ea.id the "oourt erred in not attirmatively giv· 
ing the defendant the opportunity to poll the jury."15 
7IQi.,4., P• 109, 
12Xb'd• 13IbJ.d. 
10I:b3.Se 11X9,sa 
15'11Ma 
8 
At that stage ot the case, the appeal relied on the Fourth 
Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their pe!"sons, 
houses• papers. and ettects, against uunasonable searches and 
seizures.n16 The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment was not introduced in the briet prepared tor 
the Superior Court of Oal.itornia. 
However, the Memorandum Opinion trom the Appellate Depart-
ment ot the Superior Court did pJl"eQnt the possiblt viability ot 
the Eighth Amendment in the d.iaouaaion of the rejection of the 
appeal from the trial eout oonYiction. On March 31. 1961, the 
Appellate Department of the Superior Court tiled a Memorandum 
. 
Opinion which replied that the court had "held in a number of 
oases that the section (11721) is constitutiona1•17 
This court has held in a number of cases that the section 
is constitutional. In b'"t•r•'EfiDl(1959), our er.A. '4.06Z, 
we said: •There is no men n e claim Cot appellant) that 
Health and Safety Code 11721 is unconstitutional b4H:auee it 
makes being a narcotic addict a misdemeanor.• To the eame 
effect i• 1lifl'·xt Rla1ti(1960) 1 our er. A. 11J1+22• We shall, therefore, o ow he ru • ot stare dec1s1s. 
Next, the opinion introduced the reasoning which became 
the major argument in the BAai.uaon appeal to the United. States 
Supreme Court. Presenting a rejoinder to its own first point, the 
16U;;t.tl<I ia:t.11.~iciiiatS.Ou, Amendment IV, clause (a). 
17um.:td l:ti1i11 Iv.ma• QQ»i:t »riab. m Bt1Ad1. P• 111. 
181Pisla 
9 
court mentioned a.n e:::rample of an ordinance "which made it a misde-
meanor to be a common drunk.ardn19 having been declared unconstitu-
tional by a California court. 0 In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786 
( 196o) • held that Penal Code 647 subsection 11 • •• was so vague an< 
uncertain that it was uneonstitutiona1.n20 
Explaining itiHtlt, the ccurt speculated that the precedent 
ot &D rt NIJ(btlll 
might cause the higher courts to review the cl'ime ot being a 
narcotic addict or any crime of status. Although at present 
no a~ lies fl'om the appellate depaJ:"tment ot the Superior 
Court-to the Distriot Court ot Appeal or the Supi-eme Court, 
yet habeas oox-pus li•s to test the const1tut1onalit!1ot the section in question. We would welcome such a teet •. 
Then, J!'esponding to the·second point in the cietendant•s 
appeal, the evidence obtained through u~asonable sea.rob and 
seizure, the Superior Coux-t said that the Municipal Court had 
"aoted properly in reeeiving this evtdence outside the presence of 
the jury.n22 
In People v. S.org, (1955), 45 Cal. 24 776 11 the oovt said at p. 781; •The probative value of evidence obtained b7 a search 
and seizure, however, does not depend on whether the search 
and seiZll.l'*e was legal. or illegal, and no purpose would be 
served !~ hartng the ju;ry make a second determination of that 
issue.• 
191Q;W, 20Di4t 
21 IbiQ, (William Butler Eldridge presents the status 
laws which existed in Galitornia, the District ot Columbia, 
Illinois• Michigan, and New Jersey, in H~aj~ll a~,~a3Lf1 (Chicago1 Un1vers1ty of Chicago Press, 19 7 1 PP• 9- O • 
221QM!1 
23°Reply Brief of Appellee,'' Un;i,~td SifA!«•i RJ.U>rllll QQY.£:& 
B~tfl tmsl B1cfldi, P• 2, 
10 
Concerning the seven remaining issues in the brief, the 
court said they had no merit. In conclusion, the opinion affirmed 
the Municipal Court order granting probation after 90 days in jail 
and denying a motion for a new trial. 
Again in the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of 
the City of Los Angeles, an order tor a rehearing of the case of 
People or the State ot Calitorniat plaintiff and respondent, 
versus Lawrence Robinson, defendant and appellant, was entered. 
The rehearing was d•nied on April 11, 1961.24 
Also 1 a.s directed in the Memorandum Opinion, the "appellan 
tried ••• to secure habeas oorpus relief in the District Court of 
Appeal and the California Supreme Court. 025 Both petitions were 
unsuccesstu1.26 
A notice ot appeal to the Supreme Court or the United 
States from the final order of the Superior Court of the Stn.te of 
California on March 31 1961 1 was tiled June 26, 1961. 27 The appeal 
was made in accordance with 28 United St01.tes Code Section 1257(2). 
24ncalendar n Transcript ot Record. Un~ttd4St1~1s Supremt 1..wi1....,,:,,...;;....,..~;:,....;::;.a.:.wa....-R.ui..-.1 ...,..lloilllit 370 U.S. 660(1962) 1 P• 1T_,, 
2~obinllJOn v, California, 370 u.s. 664(1962). 
26Ib1d 1 
27°Calendar," Transcript of Record, P• 114. 
11 
The provision from the Federal ».claratory Judgment Act allowed fol 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court since the appellant had exhauete< 
a.11 state remedies.28 
The transcript ot the record ot the controversy between 
Lawrence Robinson and the State ot California was tiled and an 
order noting probable jurisdiction was entered November 20 1 
1961.29 Bamu.el Carter McMorris tiled the opening briet on behalf 
ot appellant Robinson. 
In the introduction• the appeal stated the goal ot the 
argument I 
The remedy which we here seek, would delete! at least, the 
addiction phrase ot section ~11,721 1 without dong violence to the aots ot use or being under the influence ot a nareot1e 1 as 
such1 and would tree the statute books ot Califo~ ot the last remaining vestige of the crime ot vagrancy. 
'?he questions presented by the appftal began with th• state-
••nt that &action 11721 ot the California Health and Safety Code 
was in violation ot the appellant's rights under.the FoUJ'teenth 
Amendment to the United States Cql§titutJ,p.31 That wa. the reascn 
28
"Not1ce of Apfeal to the Supreme Court•" SIDi~M §ta.t11 
su12am1 Qlut »ci1tl u Btl.RSl11 P• 114. 
29Robinson v. California, 368 u.s, 918(1961), 
30"Proposed Statement on Appeal n (Appellant•s Briet), 
Uu:t.\!d §\1\11 S;;DaM 9am:1i.i£11t1 and. 61;g;ds, P• 115. 
31united States s<Gjl%iiu~1.Qui Amendment XIV, Section 11 
ttNo State shall make or en~orce any aw which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities ot citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person ot lit•• liberty, or property, 
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ot the laws." 
which had been given in the statement on appeal to the Superior 
Court o t Calitonia. 
12 
llowever, the subsequent form ot the brief was new. Instea< 
ot proceeding to the point of unlawful sea.rob and seizure, the 
reasoning developed the basis of the argument against punishment 
of status. 
Capital.izing on the suggestion from the opinion or the 
Superior Court ot Ca.litorn1a1. the appeal brief states three vmys 
in which the statute punishecU ( 1) a status1 not an act or omis-
sion; (2) an involuntQ11 status1 (3) a condition ot mental and 
physical illness. 
Besides pun18h:1ng status, or a.a involuntary condition, the 
statute was said to be ''vague, imletinite and uncertain.•32 Thia 
point had been made in the appeal to the Superior Coot of ca11-
tornia1 also. 
Furthermore, the statute was "an unwarranted. and unconsti-
tutional infringement of treed.om ot movement•"'' Alrf' pe~son 
entering the State ot California who had ever been a napcot1c 
addict was liable for arrest under the statute. 
Sinae the statute could have punished a pel'aon who had 
been a narcotic addict at any time in the past, it was said to be 
ex post :ta.cto1 too. 
3Z"Proposed Statement on Appeal," llnJ.tlSI Stat!! Slimr:tu 
Cai.£~ ijrit'I !Jl.Q B•gQJ;ilt P• 115• 
33X'.R:i.4a 
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Finally, the eighth subpoint under the major question 
raised in the brief' wast "'It imp0ses cruel and unusual pun1sh-
ment. n34 The Eighth Amendment to the United States 2Qnsflj,'tJltila 
was introduced, although not directly stated. At that time, there 
would not have been precedent for rrd.sing the issue of the applic-
ability ot the Eighth Amendment through the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Then, the second major question was that Of evidence 
obtained th.rough unr•ason.able. search and seizure., 
Third, the quest1on ot procedural due proc•as hartng been 
lacking in the conYiction was repeated. That issue had been 
. 
phrased in terms ot conflict between the law and the evidence in 
the appeal to the California Superior Court. 
More fully described in the brief to the Supreae Court, 
the argument was as tollona 
(1) There was no evidence whatso•v•r of either influence o ' 
a narcotic or addiction to a nareotie. 
(2) The only conceivable ev1dence ot venue wa.a by admis-
sions of the defendant and not as a part ot the eol'Ju• d•lict~1 (3) There was no proof of the use o.t an ill•gal narcotic.;,· 
The development a.nd substant1atj~on of the questions rested 
on fifty cases drawn from both the state and federal courts. 
Generally, the citations applied the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
states. One illustrative ease dated frrom January 4. 1926. In 
14 
Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 u.s. 385(1962), Mr. 
Justice Sutherland spoke tor the court. 
The constitutional grounds of attacit. among others, are 
that the statutory provisions it entoroed. 1 will depriv-pla1ntitf, its otticere, agents and repreattntatives, ot their 
liberty and property Without due process ot law, in Violat~gn 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution ••• 
Concerning point "(8} It Imposes Cruel and. Unusual Punish-
ment, n37 the :reasoning wass 
The Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution and 
Article I, M<h 6 Of the Ca,lifornia Constitution. both pro-
hibit cnel and unusual punisluaent, 
A penalty is GPU.el when it shooks the moral sense and out-
rages those innate principles ot humanity which hav• been 
broadened and expanded by,e1vilized enlightenment. Finley, 
In re, 1 a.A. 198 at 104. 
. 
Futhermore, 
(a) statute may be unoonstitutional upon its face oz- in its 
application. By necessary implication, since no provision is 
made tor the tapering oft ot the condition and since the court 
may take judicial notice of \'that bappens in •oold tvkey' with· 
drawala we :re-submit that the law here involved is uoonst1• 
tution;! both upon its tace and in its application. To nega-
tive this p0sition it is necessary tor aprll•• to ahOw that, 
although no proviaion tor humane treatmen of addietion of 
inc.arcerated addicts is provided in the law, sueh in taet is 
the practice of the California authorities. ~· ot course, 
would be impossible for appellee to establimi. 
36Connally v. General Construction Co~, 269 U.S. 
388(1926). 
-'~0Propcsed Statement on Appeal," Un~§l!l AUi&>ts §u'Ql•M 
&.!2~~ ~Cit§ And Rt;QrSlt P• 115. 
384bid1; 
39wg,, P• 9. 
15 
In reply, the brief or the appellee, the People ot the 
State of California, was tiled by Roger .Arnebergh, the City Attor-
ney of Los Angelesi Philip E,. Grey, the Assistant City Attorney, 
and W1.lli.am E. Doran, the D&puty City Attor11ey. In five major 
answers to th& three main questions raised by the appellant 1.:n his 
op•ning brief, the attorneys for the Stat• of California defended 
the constitutionality of Section 11721 ot the California Health 
and Safety Code. 
Pirat, in response to the question ot denial of due procesl! 
and equal protection of the la\1'8 under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the appellee's briet stated that S.ction 117Z1 was "a proper 
exercise ot the police power."40 
In defense ot the pOa1t1on1 ·the state cited recent hold-
ings, 
l!!A~ll !t 1}~,(1959)t OUll' CRA 4062, we saidt •There is 
no rneri 1nhec aim that Health and Safety Code 11721 is 
unconstitutional beeause it makes being a narcotic addict a 
misdemeanor. ' To the aw eftec t is b.,Q:RJ.1 X• »lf:U,Dt. ( t 96o) • 
our ORA. 4422. We shal.11 therefore, follow the Jiu e or stare decisis ••• 
Appellant also claims that the court er~d in not submit-
ting as to whether the searoh and seizure was lawtul ••• In 
People v. Geo:rg,(1955), 45 Cal. 2d 776. the court said at P• 
7811 •The probative value ot evidence obtained by a search 
and .seiztll'e, however, does not depend on whether the search 
and seizure was legal or illegal, and no purpose would be 
served ijf having the jury' make a second determination of that 
issue.' 
li·00Reply Brief of Appellee," Yn4.itsl §t;g.t11 Sym;Qt Q.Qw.:i 
Bi:j.t(§ Mi Bldnilt P• lOa 
4 11QiQ1 ' P• 2., 
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Second, the brief denied each of the eight reasons alleged 
in the appellant's brief to show the unconstitutionality ot the 
statute with reference to its punishing a status. 
Answering point (8) charging cruel and unusual punishment, 
the reply brief elaborated on the leniency of the punishment stipu• 
lated in Section 11?21. 
V1olat10n ot Section 11721 ot the CalitoJl>lla Health and 
Safety Code nsults 1n punishment of not less than 90 days nor 
more than one ytu 1n the county jail.. Anellant himselt as 
a :result of his conviot1on was placed on probation tor two 
ye~• subject to certain terms, inoludtng 90 daya to be served 
in the county jail. C4trtatnly such sentence could not be con-
sidered cruel or unusual (Weea v. u.s.). Purthel"mOre, the 
•cruel and. unusual' pun19hment provisions ot the Eighth Amend-
ment to th• United States Constitution ar. not made applioable 
to the states by the Four'teenth Am9ndmen42 (Penear v. Mass •• 
Weems v. v.s., eupa•t Bartkus v ... n1.), 
Third, in reply to the second major questi.on in the appel-
lant's opening brief, the State of Qalifornia denied. that Robinson 
had been subjected to an illegal search and seizure. 
Fourth1 alee in SUpJJOrt ot the reasonablenea ot th• evi-
dence being uEMd in the tna.1. the a.ppellee briet reiterated• 
California's excluaionary rules do not tall short et providing 
the protection afforded by the Fo~th and Fc:nivteenth Amendment1 
to the Un1.ted St.ates Constitution. ~ 
In the fifth section, the State ot California succinctly 
concluded that the evidence was "sufficient to support the judg-
ment. "44 
Summarizing the main point• of the argwaent in :reply to 
the appeal1 the brief repeated: "Section 11721 does not impose 
17 
cruel or unusual punishment ri.thin the long understood meaning ot 
the term.n45 
Seventy-five oases of authority ._.. cited 1n the text of 
the appellee brief for the State of Galifornia.46 
Then, in the appellant•s reply brief to the appellee•s 
brief and in the oral a.pgument before the Supreme Court on April 
171 1962, Samuel ea.z.te McMonts i-enewed the two central ideas. 
These nret ( 1) Seetion 11721 made an involunt'81'7 status a cr1me; 
and, (.2) the statute punished a condition ot mental and physical 
111n.ess•47 
In his oral argument, William z. Doran tor the State ot 
. 
Calitornia1 denied that Section 11?21 punished a status or that 
the statute was vague.48 
On June 25; 1962t the Supreme Court deci$1.on on Robinson 
V• California• 370 u.s. 660(1962)• was given, The CoUPt held that 
Section 11?2.1 ot the California Health and Safety Cod.ea. which 
punished a status• was uneonstitutional through the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment macle applic-
able to the state through the due process clau• of th• Fourteenth 
Amendment• 
4
'1W•t P• 91 
46nTable ot Authorities Cited•" Jbg1Jia4 §tat11 Sa»11111 
rs- ·--:: t:t .... ..c -~~ And BMRHlt P• iii. 
4?Robinson v. California, 8 L. Ed, 758(1962)• Annotations. 
PP• 1079-lOSO., 
48iaii•t P• 1080, 
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Mr. Justice Stewart gave the opinion of the Court. He 
wrote tor Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan, in 
addition to himselr.49 Justioes Douglae and Harlan presented •P-
a.rate coneu.rring opinione.50 Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part 
in the conside:ration or deoision.51 
Mr. Justice Stewai-t noted the question raised by Bs>b3.DIQQ• 
We noted probable jurisdiction ot this appeal, 368 u.s. 
918(1961)• because it squarely presents the iaaue whether the 
statute as construed by the California courts in this case_;!s 
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment ot the Constitution. 
Then, Mr. JusUo• Stewart affirmed 0 (t)he broad power of a 
State to regulate the narcotio drugs traffic within its borders."5~ 
Also, he diSOu88$d the permissible fOJ:"ms ot regulation Wbi.eh a 
state could uae. 
A State might impose criminal sanctions, tor -.sample, 
against the unauthorized manufacture, rrescription. sale, pur-
chase, or pGsnsaion ot narcoties \fi~h n its bordea. In the 
interest ot discouraging the Violation of such laws, or in the 
. 49Potter Stewart, Ohio(1915-) 1 appointed b:y Pnfid•nt Eis•nhower(1958-)• Earl ianen1 Republican, Cal1tonta(1891-), 
appointed by Pres~ent E1senhowr(1953-1969J• Hugo L. Black 
»em.ocratl Alabama(1886-), aJPl)inted b7 President Roonvelt(t93?-). 
William .,. Brennan, Jr., New York(1906-), appoint•d bf President 
Eisenhower( 1956-) • 
'°w1111am o. Douglas. hmoorat, Conneeti1ut(t898-) 1 ap-pointed by President Rooseveit0939-). John Marshall Harlan, New 
York(1899-) 1 appointed by President E1senhower(195.5-). 
!>1Feltx hankturter, Indfl>$ndent1 Massachusetts(1939-1965), 
appointed by President Roosevelt(1939-19o2). 
'2Robinson v, California, 370 tr.s. 664(196.2). 
''Nd· 
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interest of the general health or welfare ot its inhabitants, 
a State might establish a program ot compulsory treatment tor 
those addicted to narcotics. Such a program ot treatment 
might require periods ot involuntary confinement. And penal 
sanctions might be imposed for failul"e ~ comply with estab-
lished compulsory treatment procedures. 
In addition to the specific ways of handling narcotic 
drugs trattic by controlling the individual users, the Court pro-
posed general social welfare campaigns aimed at the total popula-
tion of the state. Mr. Justice Stewart hypothesized that narcotic 
traffic and addiction could be controlled best by "efforts to 
ameliorate the economic and social conditions under which those 
evils might be thought to tlotll*ish.u55 
Finally• in the opinion "Of the Court, Section 11?21 was 
tta statute which (made) the •status' of narcotic addiction a 
criminal offense, for which the offender (might) be prosecuted at 
any time before he reform(ed),u56 The statute was said. to convey 
guilt whether or not the person had acted.57 
Explaining the meaning ot the statute, Mr. Justice Stewart 
then began to reason by analogy. Comparing what the statute would 
have held for persons in a similar condition. the justice observeds 
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history 
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a aereon to be 
mentally~ll, or a leper• or to be afflicted with a venereal 
disease. 
• 
Citing Francis v, Resweber, 329 u.s. 459(1946), he said: 
541b4g,, 664,5. 55rb~ •• 665, 
571.~ 58rb~g. 
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in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made 
a criminal offense ot such a disease would doubtless be uni-
versally thought to be an infliction ot cruel and unusual pun;c 
ishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ~ 
Next, the opinion repeated that the statute punished a 
status which was recognized by the Court to be an illness. Quot-
ing the brief of the State in a footnote, the justice recalled: 
1 Thirty-seven years ago this Court recognized that persons addicted 
to narcotics •are diseased and proper subjects for (m.edieal) treat-
ment.• Linder v. u.s. 1 .268 u.s. 5,18."60 
Then, the holding in BIJ:a~DllD was& 
a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted (with an 
illness) as a criminal, even though he has never touthed any 
narcotie drug within the Sts:te or been guilty of aJ11 irregular 
behaVier there, 1ntl1ots a cruel and uftysual punish.ntent in 
violation ot tne Fourte•nth .Amendment. 
Concluding the opinion ot the Court 1 Mr. Justice Stewart 
acknowledged that "the narcotics trattic has occasioned the grave 
concern of govern:ment. 062 However, he admonished the states to 
*'leg1timately"63 manage that concern. 
Finally; Ms-. Justice Stewart's closing statement narrowed 
the future impact of the decision. He said that the Court had 
dealt "in this case only with an individual provision ot a pa.rticu• 
la.rized local law as it has so tar been interpreted by the Cali-
fornia courts."64 
Mr Justice Douglas concurred with the Court in a separate, 
59;t;iU· 
62niu. 
61 IQid., tn. 8, 667. 
64Iiisia 
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longer opinion. Essentially agreeing with what had been said by 
Mr. Justice Stewart, the concurrence by Mr. Justice Douglas empha-
sized the development ot the concept of cruel and unusual punish-
111ent. 
Tracing the priDlitive methods of curbing unwanted behaVior1 
which were used from the Stxt .. nth Century in England, to those of 
the present, Mr. Justice Douglas compa!'ed disea•, eapeeially 
mental illness, With narcotic addiction. 65 
After graphicall.7 describing some of the pQ'aical ettects 
of narcotic addiction• Mr. Justice Douglas introduced the method 
ot treatment currently practiced in Great Britain• Admitting that 
~ 
the Inglish approaoh was not more than eustom in his Qgument, he, 
nevertheless, emphasized the contradictory point ot vin held by 
California.66 
Next, the eomplexity ot narcotic addiction was explored. 
Mr. Justice Douglas covered the preaent lack of knowledge ot how 
to cure narcotic addiction and the respense of the community to 
that frustration.67 
Again, returning to citations of the hi.stoi-io meaning ot 
cruel and unusual pun1ahment1 Mr. Justice Douglas demanded that 
the progressive "•nlightenmentn68 concerning insanity be trans-
ferred to narcotic addiotion1 aleo.69 
66nu,, 6?3. 
6'nu. 
2.2 
Finally, Mr. Justice Douglas said that ''convicting, tt?O n.ot 
the actual "eontinement,n?l was cruel and unusual punishment. 
YJl'". Justice ~lan concurred with the Court in a short 
opinion. However, the separate statement urged caution in as~>,l· 
a.ting narcotic addiction With illness and in excluding narcotic 
addiction from aubjeetion to criminal law.72 
Hie agreement with the nversal ot th• ~lier California 
Supe:M.or Court deeiaion was baaed on the nckl•ssneu ot the trial 
court instruotions to the jur,-. •(f)he effect ot this instruction 
was to authonze orimtnal punishment tor a bare desire to commit a 
criminal act."73 To Mr. Justice Harlan1 the California statute . 
which would allow that finding would be "an arbitrary impOsition 
which excedes the power that a State ma1 exercise in enacting its 
criminal law.n74 
Mr. Justice Clark dissented from the opinion of the Court 
in which Section 11721 ot the California Health and Safety Code 
was "violative of due process as •a cruel and unusual punish-
ment.• "75 His dissent reflected knowledge of the California 
hearings a.nd recommendations to the legislature which ~ceded a 
Governor•s veto ot a bill to repeal the statute.?6 However, Mr. 
?Oz:g14, 
74w.4, 
71 lla141, 72D>idu 678. 
75:u1isi, 
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Justice Clark did not report that the Governor's veto overrode the 
sentiraent ot the California legislature which had voted in tavor 
of repeal et the statute.77 
Next, }1.r. Justice Clark mentioned the protective nature of 
handling the narcotic addict in the State ot California. He 
praised the aoo1olog1cal merit of the Ca11tol"n1a laws pertaining 
to narcotic addiction. 
Although the sootion is penal in a.ppearanoe-perhaps a carry-
over from a l•s• aopbist1cated approach--its present provisioni: 
are quite sin.d.lar to those IOJ:' civil commitment and treatment 
of addicts Who have loat the power of self-control, and its 
present purpose is retleet-1 in a statement which closely 
follows Secti.on 117211 •'!'he rehabilitation of narcotic addictE 
and the pnvention ot oontin. u.ed addiction to narcotics is a 
matter ot atateWid.•7sonoern.4 California Health and Sat•ty Code Section 11728. . 
Pursuing an extensive argument in support of California 
laws which wer• ea.id to be adequate to the problem and superior to 
the Supreme CoUl"t direction, Mr. Justice Clark dift$1"9d moat 
aharply with the portion of the majority opinion which he said 
recommended hospitaliZation tor addiction. U. argued that the 
treatment existed already.79 
Then, he doubted that punishment of status was c!'Uel and 
unusual punishment, anyway. 
The tact that Section 11?21 might be labeled •criminal' seems 
irrelevant, not only to the majority•s own. •treatment• test 
but to the •conoept of ordered liberty• to ~ich the States 
must attain under the FoU!'teenth Amendment. 
24 
rir. Justice Clark concluded that tteven if the overall statu-
tory scheme is ignored and a purpose and effect of punishment 1s 
attached to Section 11721• that provision still d.oes not violate 
the Fourteenth .Amendment.n81 "Moreover• •status• offenses hat"::; 
long been known and X'QCOgnized in the criminal law. 4 Blackstone, 
Commentaries(Jones ed. 1 1916) 1 170.n82 
Finally; he disagreed. with the appropriateness of invoking 
the cruel and unusual punishment clause ot th• Eighth Amendment. 
"Properly constl'Ued1 the statute provides a treatment rather than 
a punishment."8' 
Mit. Justice White dissented., also. He did not concur in 
giving standing to the ca• Which raised the issue ot the conatitu• 
tionality of a state statute. In his opinion; the decision was 
unnecessary. Alsot it invalidated. a state statute. Mr. Justice 
White did not approve ot that interterence.84 "Calitol*nia is 
entitled to have its statute and the record so read•••"85 
M:r. Justice White also concurred with Mr. Justice Clark 
that the statute was not being used to punish an involuntary condi· 
tion.86 Then• he said that even if the status were involuntary, 
"(t)he Court recogniZas no degrees of addiction.'*8? 
Deploring the application o:r the Fourteenth Amendment• Mr. 
Justice White speculatedt 
81
:U2i4e 82w.4., 684. 83112uu 685. 84~lh~a,, 
85J:la~t, 686. 86ia~4M 687. 87l'b14a.t 688. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment is todo.y held to bar any prosecution 
tor addiction regerdleas of the degree or trequeney ot use• 
and the Court&~ opinion brintles With indications ot further 
consequences. 
He tea.rod that the Court had "effectively removed Cali-
tornia • s power to deal effectively with the reourring case under 
the statute whefte there is ample evidence of uatt but no ev1dence 
ot the precise location ot use.n89 "Beyond this it has cast seri-
ous doubt upon the power ot any State to toPbid the use of narcotic s 
under t~at of criminal punishment.rt90 
Furthwmen, the new application of the Eighth ~ndment 
was said to be ina.ppt'Opri.ate bffauee ot lack of preffdent.91 
Pi.nallYt he said that ti. Court had dealt in matters 
better lett to "either the States or Congreas ... 92 Mr. Justice 
White did not aeeept the Court•s "own abstract notions of how best 
to handle the nareotics problem .• n93 
88Ib~, 
92:u •• si. 
III 
ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE AND RAMIFICATIONS 
OF B>.llINSOlf 
~it ftQ!Q.bitiqn As1+n§t funigtQ.qs StatJag 
Between 1962 and 1970, a major trend found in the cases 
citing the precedent of Bobinsan has been the application ot the 
principle ot the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment to crimes of ctatus. The federal cases analyzec 
have been divided among six categories. These are: (1) narcotic 
addict; (2) alcoholic; (3) vagrant; (4) hippie; (5) mentally ill; 
and, (6) sex offender. 
The following discussion has been organized to show the 
chronological development ot decisions within each category. 
Through the observation ot the reliance upon the precedent of 
Rgb.D§OQ, the wide scope and diverse ramifications or the Supreme 
Court decision have become obvious. 
Until 19?0, in the United States federal court system, 
there had been twenty-two cases which dealt with some question ot 
narcotics and that referred directly to Rgpig§QD• Six cases have 
been in the federal district courts. Sixteen eases have been 
decided in the federal circuit courts of appeals. r-1ost of the case• 
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have been attempts to clarify the ruling about the status ot nar-
cotic addicts and to extend the ~obin§OD decision to other facets 
ot the narcotics issue. 
The six federal district court cases between 1962 and 1970 
were brought in six different courts of the ninety-one districts. 
They were civil claims based upon federal law. Five of the six 
petitions were requestins write of habeas corpusJ all five were 
rejected. 
One of the six pet1tio~s was an action for a decla=atory 
judgment and an injunction; that was denied, also. 
In none ot the district ~ases was the direct application 
ot the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment :made to a similar tactual situation. N~vertheless, the 
influence or the Rgbinsgn decision was present. The bases tor 
attempting to gain writs and a declaratory judement were the 
Supreme Court ruling • 
. Also, the acknowledgment or the ruling in the Bob~Jl§On cas 
was positive. The courts agreed that the Supreme Court had invali 
dated Section 11721 ot the California Health ~nd Safety Code which 
punished the .status of narcotic addiction. 
In the first district court case, Diaz v. California, 217 
F. Supp. 47!3(1963), the plaintiff, Manuel.Diaz said that his 
detention at the California Rehabilitation Center, Chino, Cali-
fornia, was illegal because the arrest by San Die~o narcotics 
officers was made on the basis ot the void Section 11721 ot the 
Health and Safety Code in direct violation or the Robinson decisi 
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However, the judge did not comment on the substantive meri 
of that assertion. Instead, he denied the petition tor a writ of 
habeas corpu.s on procedural grounds. 94 
Quoting from Section 2254 ot Title 28 United States Code 
Amended, the Federal Regulatory Act, he explained, in parts 
An application tor a writ of habeas corpus in behalf ot a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant h~5 exhausted the remedies available in the courts ot the State. 
The second petition tor a writ of habeas corpus was that 
ot the State of Louisiana ex rel. Ernest Htq"es v. Allgood, 254 F. 
Supp. 913(1966). In denying the writ, District Judge West "held 
that a statute making it unlawful •to be or become• a drug addict 
did not constitutie cruel and unusual punishment in violation ot 
the constitutional prohibition."96 
While indicating acceptance ot the Rqbi;s;n precedent, the 
judge differentiated between the California statute and the perti-
nent Louisiana statute. 
Citing the case ot State ot Louisiana ex rel. Blouin v. 
Walker, 244 La. 699(1963) 1 he recalled: 
(T)he Louisiana Supreme Court held in §lQU~ll that the ~insgn 
decision was not applicable to the Louisiana statute. e 
United States Supreme Court agreed, and on JanuaJ11 131 1964, denied certiorari. Watkins v. Walker, 375 U.S. 988(1~64). 
94n1az v. California, 217 F. Supp. 479(1963). 
95J;b~sJ1 
96state ot Louisiana ex rel. Ernest Hayes v. Allgood, 254 
P. Supp. 913(1966), 
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In both the BlQYiD case and this case, the petitioners 
were convicted ot drug addiction, were given suspended sen-
tences on condition that they go to a hospital for medical 
relief, and after violating their probation, we~' sentenced to 
serve time in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. 
The holding supported the rights ot states to provide 
their own legal sanctions and to determine criminal behavior. 
In the case ot Burmeister v. New York City Police Depart-
ment, 275 F. Supp. 690(1967), plaintiffs, "Peter Burmeister, 
Ronald Johnson and James Hutchinson1198 requested "action for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive reliet.n100 
Judge Tenney ot the southern District ot New York settled 
the case in a form similar to that in Diaz v. Calitornia1 217 F. 
Supp, 478(1963). Be based hie opinion on procedural grounds: 
failure to raise a substantial federal question and to exhaust 
state remedies. 101 
Pierce v. Turner, 276 F. Supp. 289(1967), the second 1967 
case1 was a habeas corpus proceeding, also. Among the facts or 
the case was the situation of a second-degree murder charge "in-
volving a glue-sn1tt1ng episode during which (the) defendant 
allegedly attempted to stab ghosts while the lights were out.n 102 
97112w •• 914. 
98Burme1ster v. New York City Police Department, 275 F. 
Supp. 690(1967). 
99isi4· 100iRi41 101 Ih14a 
102Pieree v. Turner, 276 F. Supp. 289(1967). 
The admission ot glue-sniffing was central to the request tor a 
writ of habeas corpus on the basis of BQR1D§S2n!03 
Since the trial court had given "instruction applying the 
modern M•Naghten test ot legal 1nsanity,tt104 the defendant said 
that the case had "moved beyond the bounds of due process0105 and 
had "rendered it one of cruel and unusual punishment."t06 The 
thrust ot the argument was that the insanity test implied the 
question of involuntary behavior which had been the ~aais tor the 
R,Qbinsgn decision. 
Judge Christensen ot the district court disagreed. In his 
reasoning, the judge referred to RQbiDl52D• He saidi "punishment 
~ 
ot a status, as suoh, apart from th• commission With specific 
intent ot an att1rmat1ve criminal act ••• (was) not involved or 
reached in this case.n 107 
The sentence had been tor judgment ot a criminal action, 
not tor the condition ot insanity through glue-sniffing. 
The fourth of the district court habeas corpue proceedings, 
Ortega v. Rasor• M.D., 291 F. Supp. 748(1968)' was, also, a dis-
charge from custody in a facility which was basically a mental 
institution. 
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In the judgment, the petition for a writ ot habeas corpus 
was denied; but, the petitioner was discharged from the custody ot 
the Surgeon General tor return to the United States Marshal. 108 
However• the judge did not invalidate an article ot the 
federal Narcotic Rehabilitation Act which provided tor commitment 
ot narcotic addicts to the custody of the Surgeon General tor trea1~ 
ment. BolU.DllD was not extended. to an act which ordered compulso~ 
treatment since Ortega "had acted of his volition in requesting 
civil comm:S.tment."109 
Showers v. Lloyd, 296 F. Supp. 441(1969) 1 was the most 
recent dietriet court oaae in wldch a p•titioner, 11who was in 
state custody pursuant to his conviction upon his plea of guilty 
to the charge ot possession ot heroin,"110 was denied his petition 
for a WJ'it ot habeas corpus. 
In his opinion, District Judge Hauk held that delay in sen• 
teneing until atter the petitioner's discharge from the narcotics 
rehabilitation center did not deprive him ot due process of law. 11 
Referring to RAllialSHh the opinion denied. that sentencing after h12 
discharge from th• rehabilitation center was double jeopardy. 
Petitioner contends that his commitment tor- narcotic addic· 
tion was a criminal sentence, and thus the subsequent sentence 
by the Los Angeles County Superior Court consl.tuted a double 
l08ortega v. Rasor, M.D., 291 F. Supp. 748(1968). 
1091Rid1t 749. 
llOSbowers v. Llody, 296 F. Supp. 441(1969). 
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punishment for the same offense. The California Superior 
Court has consistently held that no penal sanctions are in-
volved in such a commitment tor narcotics addiction ••• 
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Should commitment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 
Code• 3051 be considered penal in nature it is clear that thE 
doctrine ot Robinson v. California• 370 b.s. 660(1962) 1 would 
require that the statute be declared unconstitutional. This 
Court is satisfied that the statutes in question are not unc~, 
stitutional on the ground that they permit double punishment. -
Besides the district court cases, BQ'Qiqggn was cited in 
sixteen federal circuit toUl"ts ot appeals. 'l'hre• ot the eleven 
circuits were represented in those cases. 
Concerning the decisions in the oases, the majority ot 
them upheld lower court Jl"Ulinget eleven upheld decieions or denied 
petitions to vacate or correct aentenees. Four of the cases were 
~ 
reversed. Three ot thoM ... re remanded tor new trials. In two ot 
the tour oases granting appeals and. reversing lower eourt decisions 
the precedent ot h\d.;llD was cited to substantiate reaMna tor tht 
deeiaions. However• in the otheJ!i two decisions which were revers~ 
Rsa1.UQD was not central to the final opinion of the Court., 
Nevertheless, in th• cases which denied petitions or uphelc 
lower court rulings, there were direct references to ~DSQD• 
Through those cases, the relationship of narcotic addiotion to ill· 
ness was stressed and, then, dismissed in later cases. Also, the 
weight of the is2RiDIQ& decision was found in dissenting opinions in 
three cases. 
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Consequently, there bas been no sustained extension of the 
Supreme Court ruling in the later narcotic cases of the federal 
circuit courts ot appeal.a. The question of status has not been 
raised again. 
In 1963, the first federal circuit court ot appeals ease. 
Nickens v. u.s., 323 F. 2c:l 808(1963) 1 was heard in the second 
District of Columbia Court ot Appeals. The opinion included an 
indirect nterence to IAbiQMD• 
Concurring With the Court1 Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright 
obseJ'vedt "This case involves a drug addict. Narcotics addictio 
poses a IJeJ'ioua problem tor eooi•t1t but the solutions at times 
attempted raise other dangera•"f13_ 
The footnote reteNnoes given indicated the hearings at 
the White House Contenu•• on ?farootic and Drug Abuse during whioh 
the BQl4Ugg finding• ..,. Mntioned indirectly., 
It is now •ovel'Wbelld.nsl.7 aooepted.• th.At •addiction is the 
manifestation of d.1..._ and. not in ita•lt a crime.• State-
ment ot Senator Jaoo'b Jt.. Ja.vits, Proceedings, Wh1te1~uM Conference on Nai-ootio and Drug Abu.-1 P• 71\1962). 
However, ad.ace the appellant "was convicted in the United 
States District CoUl"t fol' the District of Columbia ••• ot posses-
sion• sale, and imPortation of narcotics," 11 5 and not tor addictio 
the Supreme Court decision was not considered applicable. 
The case of liightoW'el" v. u.s., 325 F. 2d 618(1963) 1 refer-
red to iRla:~Ui5Ul in a footnote which extended the reasoning about 
11
'1rickens v. u.s., 323 F. 2d 813(1963) 
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the correlation ot narcotic addiction and mental disease. 
We do not, ot course, pass on the correctness ot these 
views ••• As to proposals tor the •tnatment' of drug addicts 
and methods, past and current, f'or their •punishment,• s•• 
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dou~las in-¥tbinson v. 
California, 370 u.s. 660,668 e·t seq. (196Z). • '' 
Although the information in the footnote did not influence 
the decision in lij.ghtODJ't it did have an etf'ect on later cases in 
which the treatment ot narcotic addicts and mentally ill persons 
was oonsi.dered to be the same. 
Also• BIR~ilStQ was mentioned in the dissent by Circuit 
Judge hbJ',117 
Th• third District of Columbia oase, Brown v. u.,s., 331 F • 
. 
2d 822(196't.) 1 decid•d the appeal of Alvin J. Brown who Challenged 
his distnet court conviction tor narcotie eharges. 118 Heard 
before Senior Cil'cuit Judge Edgerton and Cinuit Jud«•• Wright and 
McGowan• the case emphasized ~· 
The moving papers contained all•gations of long narcotic 
addic.tion whieht ~Citing unqu•s. tioned by the Government or the 
Court• must be uiten as true. • (N)arcotic addiction i" an ill .. 
ness ••• Ot course it is genera1ly conceded that a narcotic 
addict, particularl~ one addicted to the use ot hel!'Oin~ is in 
a state of mental and physical illness.• "!inaon v. Califor-
nia, 3?0 u.s. 660, 66? and note 8, (1962). 
L1oyd v. _u,.s. • 343 F. 2d 242( 1964) t the fourth District of 
Columbia Circuit Cour't of Appeals case, was an aPJ*tl of a co:ivic-
tion for violation of the Harrison Act of 1914, which made crimina' 
11 6Hightower v. u.s., 325 F. 2d 618(1963). 
117Ibia •• 616. 
118Brown v. u.s., 331 F. 2d 823( 1964) • 
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a.ny unauthorized manufacture, possession; control, sale, prescrip-
tion or dispensation of narcotic drugs. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decinon. Cii'euit Judge Fahy dissented. Also dis-
senting were Chief Judge Bazelon and Cucuit Judges Washington and 
Wright; they eaida 
This petition should be granted tor two reasons; (1) The 
trial judge's 1ntex-terenoe with jury consideration of the 
inse.nit1 defense ••• (.?) The presence of substantial constitu-
tional question.a which have been presented to this court with 
increasing trequenoy. These questions 81'8 {a) whether punish-
ment ot an addict sueh as be1 who• puchatN and possession ot 
narcotic drugs is explained entirely by his personal need for 
repeated doaages ot tlu.s11 1• oru.· el and unusua11,,nishment, Robinson v. Cal1torn1a, ,70 u.s. 660(1962) ••• 
The third 1964 Diatnot of Columbia case and the second 
~ 
to be remanded, Jackson v. u.s., 336 F. 2d .579(1964), did not rely 
on BAl?iDIAD tor the majerit1 opin:Lon. Remanded With instructions., 
the case was a sucoesatul aPJ91Al et the defendant's conviction ot 
"narcotic violatio111a.0120 
In Chief Judge aaz.lon•a dissent, which was a diaaent in 
part only, the iQ!!~D•I pHted•nt waa attirmed with reference to 
other governmental support ot the ruling. 
Authoritative declarations from institutions in all three 
branches ot Government recognize a relation between drug 
addiction and mental illness ••• The Supreme Coutttl (I)t is 
generally conceded that a narcotic addict, particularly one 
addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state ot mental and 
:Ph~sical1 ~tlness. Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660, t;6, ••• 
119Lloyd v. u.s., 343 F. 2d 245(1964). 
120 Jackson v. u.s., 336 F. 2d 5?9(1964). 
121 I.Q:td1. 581. 
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The fourth 1964 District or Columbia Cirevi t Cou_rt of 
Appeals ease• the Adams v. U, s. , 337 F. ld 548 ( 1964,) 1 petition, 
was to vacatf!J or correct lower court action on a Hc1rrison Act 
violation for narcotics offenses. Al though the petition was denied 
Chiet Judge Ba.zelon again dissented in an opinion which used 
Ro\1:&,n§On to foster the legal connection between narcotic addiction 
and mental problems. 
It appears that our indigent petitioner has a history of 
drug addiction and claims to have been an ad.diet at the time 
of the alleged nareotics offenses; that he was convicted of 
Harrison Act violations by a f !!Y unaware that he wished to 
raise an insanity defense ••• 
•••• here the point at issue is not the merits ot pet1t1oner•s 
insa.n.1ty defense! bur2,heth«t" petitioner was denied a constitu· tionally fair tr al. . 
Th• tirst 1965 case in the Circuit Court ot Apl)9als, 
Hutcherson v. u.s., 3~5 F. 2d 964(1965), involved What beoame a 
narcotics arrest after an initial detainment tor being ~aught 
drinking an alcoholic bev.rage in the J>"Mnce of an otticer. 124 
Replying to Hutchereon•s appeal, Senior Cireuit Judge of 
the Court ot Appeals, Wilbur K. Miller, held that the ten-year 
sentence tor the two offenses was not cruel and unusual punishment 
and that Hutcherson was not able to choo• to be proMeuted under 
District of Columbia law rather than tedel'al statutes. 125 
t l .,,...,.,. n a ,.....,~ 
122 Adams v., u.s., 
124-suteherson v. 
1251.Qut ... 964. 
337 F. 2d 548(1964). 123!bUa, 549. 
U,s., 345 F. 2d 965(1965). 
Yl 
However, Chiet Judge Bazelon dissented in part. Referring 
to the portion or the appeal entitled "Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, •1126 the Chiet Judge notedt "Appellant argues for the first 
time on appeal that Robinson v. California. 370 u.s. 660(1962)• 
bars punishment tor possession and concealment ot narcotics.n127 
Reminding the Court ot the '*11tJ.1 holding, which was then 
before the Court or1 appeal "No. 17894• 120 u.s. App. D.c._, 0128 
Chiet Judge Bazelon suggested that flthe Rga~nman &r&"Ument ••• is 
more properly to be made to the Supreme Cou.rt."129 
'l'h•n• calling tor additional study of the tta.ssertion ot 
voluntar1neas"130 in the decisions which rejected the ll~iDUQA 
~ 
preeedentt the Chief Judge obeerved: 
Indeed1 the question or responsibility is the h._,.t of the 
addict•s argument that he should not be punished tor posses~ 
Addicts have frequently been successful in this jur:18dietion 11 
raising ·the inaani ty d•tense.. Other theories. to exouae rea-
ponsibili tY t suoh as •ph~cologieal duress,' haw also been 
advanced ••• I submit that Btl2i112D requires senoua oonsidera· 
tion ot these claims as matters atteeting responaibility. But 
I am constrained to ae;rff that n cannot constitr th•• claims 
now since they were not advanced below and no eYidenee was 
oftAPad.1to ehow that here pessession was compelled by addic-ti.on~ r~ 
That "state court reluote.nce to extend l!Qbi:U§An seems to rest on a 
conclusive presumption ot responsibil1tytn132 was the reason 
offered by Chief Judr;e Bazelon tor the need to examine the questiox 
ot ree:ponaibility and cruel and unusual punishment. 
126:[b.d, t 977. 127 I.Qli1. 
130lb~4a. 131..tP.JJ!t, 9r;. a. 
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u.s. ex rel. Swanson v. Reineke, 3l+lt. r. 2d 260(1966), was 
the second circuit covt case in 1965 which upheld a district 
court conviction tor both possesSion and aelt•adm1nistrat1on of 
narcotics. However, the vehicle, a federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing, through which the appeal was made was unuaual. 
Nevertheless. Circuit Judges Waterman, 1.riendly and Hays 
heard the caet on its merits. In the opinion, CS..ouit Judge 
Friendly heldl 
Conneotieut statutes forbidding any pereon to manufacture. 
posseu1 have under his control, sell, pnseribe• dispense, 
compound1 administer to himself or another or be addicted to 
use ot nuootie drug and specifying measure of P'miahment for 
crimes thus defined were not unconstitutional a.a applied to 
dete~''who pleaded guilt7 to selt-adminiatration Of nar-
cotics. 
Summarizing the rejection ot B®il&IOB• Cireuit Judge 
Friendly atatedt 
We are unabl• to believe that a decision stat_. by the 
Supreme Court to b9 lild.tecl to •a particularized loeal law as 
it has so tu been interpreted• by the looal oou:rte waa meant 
to prevent all state l•gtslaturea and Congress .,._ detes--
ld.ning, if th•f eee tita that the •lt-admin1atration ot nar-
cotics or other noxious aubata.nces, and attendant purohaae or 
:posaeeeion, involve such dangers to their umtrs* eueh potential 
ot creating new addicts, and such other harmful social by-
products, that proof ol etJ"Ong emotion;t'4,or even et ph;r.s1olog1• 
oal compulsion shall not be a defense. 
The third 1965 cireuit court case, Moralee v. u.s., 344 r. 
Zd 846(196.5) 1 was one ot two Ninth Circuit appeals. In t'tte 
133u.s. ex rel. Swanson v. Reineke, 344 r. 2d 260(1966). 
1
'4nw.. 263. 
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district court, Moral.ea had been prosecuted "for concealment and 
facilitation of· concealment of heroin. tt 1.:~5 Tb.rough the appeal, 
the opinion reached was that the detendant•a oonstitutional rights 
had been violated. 
However• the case did not deal with Bollil.QU except in a 
footnote Which said that the case did not pertatn. 136 
In the record of this ease however, there 1• tto cl•~ evidence 
that appellant was addict;! to the compulsive tUM ot narcotics; 
conaeque11f"• there is no adequate supperting P"lli• for his 
argum:ent. 
In 1965, the case ot Castle v. u.s., 347 F. 2d. 492(1965), 
was appealed from the District of Colwnbia District Court. 
Circuit Judge Wright treated th• ease in a manner whieh nversed 
the trend toward combining narcotic addiction and mental illness. 
He saidl 
(T)estimoey relating to narcotic addiction pnv1d94 a basis 
from Which the juryt under proper inst;ruotion~ eGttld have 
tound a causal l:*'elationship b•tween defendant'• cbug-rttlated 
ab•olfaal:l.ty and the cha.pged oft•nna of purohaa:ln.g dhga With-
out a tax staap and taoilitating the concealment and sale of 
drugs knowing them to have bffn imported contrQ't te law, but 
the jUX'y was not nquind to find. on the ertdeno that d•f,!e-
da.nt had mental disability wh1oh caused the a.eta Charged. · 
Sine• the appellant•s ela1m rested on that 1eaue of the 
relationship of drug purchase and mental disabilit7, the lower 
court connction was upheld. The appeal had been baaed on the 
growing tradition of linking narcotic addiction and mental illness. 
135Moral.es v. u.s., 344 F. 2d 847(1965). 
136zb'Q•1 tn. z. 137Ib=L9s 
1380ast1e v. u.s., 347 F. 2d 492(1965). 
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However, the need to stop that aasociation was advocated 
by Circuit Judge Burger, in a eoncurring opinion to that of 
Circuit Judge Wrightt '*Neither this couri nor any other court has 
ever held that drug addiction is per se a toJ'm of mental disease 
or •insanity• in the context ot assessing Ol"ind.nal responsibil-
ity.n 139 
Instead of oontinuin5 to build a nt ot ••• in which 
addiction was equated With disease, the ~stlg appeal atress~d the 
right ot federal regulation of interstate commerce with respect to 
narcotics. Circuit Judge Burger warned that continuing to combine 
narcotic addiction and disease was "opening the dooi- to evading 
~ 
the severe penalties Congress has fixed for tratticldng in 
narcotics~" 140 
The titth 1965 circuit court case and the teurth one in 
the District ot Columbia to consider a narcotic otten&et Heard v. 
u.s., 348 F. Zd 43(1965), affirmed a district court oonviction. 
The Court ot Appeal.a held that evidence showing at mat that 
detendant•s behavior controls might have been atl•ctecl it 
defendant were deprived ot heroin was insuttici•nt.to warrant 
instruction en mental disea• or detect resulting mm ad.di~ 
t1onl in absence ot showi.ng th.at defendant was d~ived ot 
hero n at the time Of the ottenset especiall7 'flMH then was 
evidence that detendfflt had large quantities of heroin at the 
time ot the offense. 
Another rejection ot the ca•s whioh attempted to correlate 
41 
narcotic ~ddiction and mental illness• the opinion commented upon 
BQb;l.p;agn in negative terms. Explaining that every addiot•s case 
was not an insanity case• a footnote clEUtitied the :tollo'Wingt 
Reference in the dissent to our ambiguous if not mislead-
ing statement in Brown v. United States• 118 u.s. A.pp. D.c. 76 ( 1964), requires that the quotation from .BnD. and the reli-
ance on Robinson v. California1 370 u.s. ~667 ••• be sc.ru""' 
tinized in eon.text. 
That portion of the .BmD quotation from ftW.UOf which 
states that narcotics adarct!otiJs a mut&3. 1.~nens not the 
language of the Supreme Court, 
The tirst 1966 District ot Col1Jmbia Circuit Court of 
AppQls case, Hansford v .. u.s., 365 :r. 2d 920(1966), Nversed a 
decision ot the district court which bad. convicted appellant 
Hansford ot a federal narcotic Violation. The opinion merted. to 
the earlier holdings that there W'1us a connection bet.,..•n narcotic 
addittion and mental illness. 
However, Circuit Judge Danaher, who dissented hem the 
opinion ot the Court, reminded the justice.a of pnnou.a d•o18ions 
which had rejecte4 that relation.ship of nareotic a4Uct.ion and 
mental illness. "This court tu ·klwlE earlie:r rejected the con-
tention of one or two of our colleagues as to their construetion 
or Robinson v. Calltornia• 310 rr.s. 6601 £62(1962).•1'*3 
Also, in 1966, in the Northern Di.strict ot Illino1s1 u.s. 
v. Oliver, 363 F. 2d 1.5(1966) 1 affirmed. a lower court conviction 
tor aale ot narcotics, resisting.prrest and a.sea.ult. There was 
1421bW •• tn. 3, 45. 
143B.anstord v. u.s. 1 365 F. 2d 927, tn. 2(1966). 
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admission or narcotics use .?.nd addiction. However, the crimes wit] 
which Oliver was charged were not thought to have been contused 
with his status. "Addiction to narcotics is not itse 1 r a crime. 
Robinson v. Cali torn1a, 370 U. s. 660 ( 1962) • tt H+4 
The second Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Joseph v. 
Klinger, 378 P'. 2d 308(1967), was an appeal "in forma pauperis tro11 
an order ot the United States District Court for the Central Dist-
rict or Californ1a.u 145 
In the opinion which atfirrned the lower court decision, 
Judge Barnes ttheld that defendant's conviction and sentence ror 
driving an automobile while under the influence of narcotics did 
not constitute a cruel and unus~al punishment.nl46 
'!"he Court ot Appeals separated the state of addiction from 
any action performed while under the influence of narcotics. 
While appellant was tried after Robinson v. St. ot Calit., 
370 U.S. 660t1962), he cannot rely on its 'cruel and unusual 
punishment; theory, because of the distinction made by the 
California Supreme Court between the crime charged in f!j~nsqn (status of addiction) and that charged here (the aot o 1 'iv-ing) described in 23105 ot the California Vehicle Code. 
Also, in 1967, the case of Bailey and Smith v. u.s., 386 Fi 
2d 1(1967), held that RQatnsog was limited to the criminality or 
addiction; and, concealing and transporting illegally imported 
144u.s. v. Oliver, 363 F. 2d 18(1966). 
l45Joseph v. Klinger, 378 F. 2d 308(1967). 
146IbA4.., 
l47Ibj.g., 311. 
narcotics and purchasing nar~otics not trom the original stamped 
package Violated federal narcotics prohibitions. 148 
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Then, the first Second Circuit Court ease to comment on 
cruel and unusual punishment with reference to narcotics, u.s. v. 
Chow1 398 F. 2d 596(1968), affirmed a conV1ct1on of the United 
States District Court tor the Southern District ot New York. Not 
a major point in the opinion, the section which mentioned the 
Eighth Amendment clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment 
was raised in issue and dismissed. It was not considered substan-
tial. 
(A) five-year minimum sentence under the Narcotic Control Act 
did not constitute a cruel a.nd unusual punishment prohibited 
by the Eighth Amendment even wnen applied to a mother who had 
no previous criminal record a11149whose nine-year-old twins were dependant on her tor support. 
Although Rgb,n§.QQ was cited, the leneth ot the prison sen-
tence was not cruel and unusual pun.ishment "in the light of Chow•s 
significant participation in a large scale narcotics conspiraey." 1~ 
In Worthy v. u.s., 409 F. 2d 1105(1968), the Circuit Court 
ot Appeals of the District of Columbia upheld the decision of the 
district court which convicted the defendant of Violating narcoticf 
laws. 
l48Ba11ey and Smith v. u.s., 386 F. 2d 1(196?). 
11t·9u. s. v. Chow• 398 F •. 2d 596, 7(1968). 
150
:tb:l.9tt 598. 
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Heard before Sen:tor Circuit Judge Fahy and Circuit Judges 
Burger and Wright, the case was decided by Senior Jud~e Fahy, who 
wrote the opinion, and Circuit Judge Burger. Circuit Judge Wright 
dissented. 151 
The opinion did not extend to BobLuiRll• However, in Judge 
Wright's dissent, the concept or status was introduced to show tha 
the statute under which the arrest had been made was unconstitu-
tional. 
Appellant (Worthy) was convicted on two counts ot violatio 
of narcotics laws. The narcotics themselves, which were intro 
duced into evidence at trial, were discovered by the police 
when they searched appellant after arresting him for vagrancy 
under 22 D.c. Code 3302(1967) ••• the statute autb:ortzea arres (and search) tor a status which1 arguably• cannot constitution 
ally be made the subject ot the1,!iminal sanction. Robinson v California, 370 u.s. 660(1962). 
Through citations in the twenty-two federal f#aaes ot nar-
cotics convictions, the Bg~n19n decision has been tested since 
1962. In the cases, the .Supreme Court ruling has not been consis-
tently applied, however, Also, the elemen.ts ot commerce ngulatio 
ot narcotics traffic and of punishment tor criminal behavior while 
under the influence ot narcotics have not been found to be within 
the scop• ot the decision. 
Similarly, the legal status of alcoholimn has been reviewe 
by cases which have used BQpinaan citations• Six cases have in-
cluded reasoning, at least in part, from Bopin§Rn to deci9e issues 
151worthy v. u.s., 409 r. 2d 1105(1968). 
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about peroo"1s convicted or vio:tati:n.s lawe which p1.1nish.ed alcohol-
ism. 
In Bates v. Rivers, 323 F •. '2d 311(1963), the appeal in-
volved a conviction tor intoxication while on parole after having 
served time in prison ror another charge. Although Circuit Judge 
Eurger held tha.t Bates was not entitled to apply his time spent on 
parole age.inst the remaining sentence following revocation ot ~ 
ole tor intoxication, Circuit Judge Wright disagreed. 
BgQ~QBQD was introduoed and dismissed in the dissent, how-
ever. The argument was based on the difference between the maxi-
mum sentence a.u·thorized (72 months) and the actual time in custody 
~ 
(?5 months). 
Then, in 1966t the case of Driver v. Hinnant, 3;6 F. 2d 761 
(1966), approximated both the tactual situation and the decision ir. 
The Court ot Appeals ••• held that a North Carolina statute 
providing that auy person found drunk or intoxicated. on a pub-
lic highway or at any public place or meeting ab.all be guiltJ;~. 
of a misdemea.nor could not be applj.ed to a chronic alcoholic •• _...... 
Circuit Judge Albert v. Bryan explained that the "unwilled 
and ungovernable111 55 quality ot chronic alcohol1$Dl caused the 
status to be within the ruling ot ig:Q;LnsQQ• 
Compounding preoedent tor the defense ot chx'onic alcoholism 
1 ; 11Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F. 2d 762( 1966) • 
1554122.sl.,, 763. 
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in contrast to pub11,c intoxioat.ion, the C9.se of Enster v. District 
of Columbia• 361 F. 2.d 50(1966), in which Circu:i.t Ju<lce Fahy, 
Ch:tet t.iudge nazelo11 nud Circuit Judea HcGowe.n joined,. r,_saerted: 
There can be no judgment ot criminal con.Viction passed upon 
him. To do so would affront the Eighth Amendment, af' eruel anc 
unusual punish.r11ent in brandin~;5gim a er1minal, 1ri•espective or consequent detention or tine. 
Also, in 1966, the Supreme Court ease ot Budd v. Calif-
ornia, 385 u.s. 911 ( 1<)66), included B2'RiDl\1D in Hr. Justice Fortas• 
dissent. Although the Court denied certiorari in the ease, Mr. 
Justice Fortas stressed the need tor 1.nstrl:\etion on state laws 
eoverning alcoholism. 
Mr. Justice Stewart's op1ni0t1 for the Court in Bt&lltmra makes 
it clear that a State may not constitutionally inf~ punish-
ment tor an illness, l~ther the illness be narcoticua addiotior 
or the •common cold.• 
One year later, Powell v. Texas, 392 u.s. 514(196?), did 
raise the issue of the constitutionality of a statute Which pun-
ished publ1.c intoXication. The opinion ot Mr. Justice Black with 
which Hr. Justice Harlan co11curred, emphasized that Powell v. 
Texas, 392 u.s. 514(1967), was not within the scope et igbiustn• i!X 
However, Mr. Justice White, who concurred in the result, 
disagreed with Justices Black and Harlan concerning the appropriate• 
ness of Bal!'8n:IPD• 
156Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F. 2d 50(1966). 
l57Budd v. California~ 385 U.S. 911(1966). 
158Powe11 v. Texas1 392 u.s. 537(196?). 
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Unless BQb4DiAD is to be abandoned, the use ot narcotics by an 
addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law. Simi-
larly, the chronic alcoholic with an irrestible urge to consume 
alcohol5ahould not be punishable tor drinking or tor being drunk. ':I 
Repeating his earlier views in .l.Y.U. Mr. Justice Fortas, 
who dissented from the opinion of the Court, supported the prece-
dent of BalaiaSGD• 
!¥biDIQD stands upon a principle which, despite its 
sublEty, must be simply stated and respectfully applied be-
cause it is the foundation ot individual 11.bert.7 and the cor-
nerstone ot the relations between a civilized state and its 
citizenst Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a 160 person tor being in a condition he is powerless to change. 
In its decision, the Court distinguished between chronic 
alcoholism and public intoxicatton. The former was cons14•red to 
be unpunishable because involuntary. The latter was sa.14 to be 
criminal behaVior. or within the criminal laws. Since Powell was 
charged with the latter, he was convicted justly, according to the 
Supreme Court at that time. 
Then, in 1968t Doughty v. Beto, 396 F. 2d. 128(1968), which 
did involve a conviction tor alcoholism, was not governed by the 
Rn~~na~n precedentJ because, the conviction rested. on behavior, not 
the status itselt. 161 
From the six cases between 1962 and 1970, the status ot 
alcoholism has followed that ot narcotics addiction With respect tc 
159.llWl.t..1 548, 9. 16019~.' 56'7. 
t6tDoughty v. Beto, 396 F, 2d 130(1968). 
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the oriminal law. The involuntary condition has been removed trom 
criminal sanction, but any criminal behavior has not been excused. 
Alsoa vagrancy, the ripe issue stated in the Memorandum 
Opinion ot the State of California Superior Court which prompted 
the structuring ot the RQi~DIAD appeal to the Sup.rem• Court in 
terms of a statue question, has been shown to be within the scope 
ot the Supreme Court ruling. Clearly held to be exempt ot crimi-
nal sanction, tlie status of vagrancy was absolved in two federal 
court cases betwen 1962 and '962 and 1970. 
First brought to the Supreme Court in Hioka v. District of 
Columbia• 383 u.s. 257(1965) 1 the issue of vagrancy was not de-
~ 
cidedS because; the case was denied certiorari. 
However, Mi-. Justice Douglas commented on the issue in a 
dissenting opinion which said that certiorari should have been 
granted.. Quoting his own concurring opinion in BQ.:Q;la•D• Mr. 
Justice Douglas saidt n1 do not see how •conomio o• social status 
can be made a crime any moH than being a drug addict aan be. 
Robinson v. California• 370 u.s. 6601 668(coneurring opinion)."162 
Later• a three-judge district court tor the District of 
Colorado declared a vagrancy statute void in Goll•an v. Kneoht, 
295 r. Supp. 897(1969). The judges elaborated on va~ancy corre-
lated to the status of narcotic addiction in BG~iDlll• Citing 
-
1~cks v. District ot Columbia, 383 u.s. 2,52(1965). 
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fgw1llt Ro'Q~QsoD, and ldmu:Qcb Judge William E. Doyle reasoned.1 
It addiction to narcotics is a status which the legislature 
cannot validly declare to be a crime under Rab~UIADt it tollowe 
that the Colorado attempt to declare idleness or indigenc1 
eoupled with being ablebodied must aleo (indeed even more) be 
held beyond the power ot the state legislative body. The 
statute, in part at 1.ast1 does not r9<1.utr. either act or · behaVior. It deals with condition. Therefore, insofar as the 
statutory pl'escription seeks to legislate against status, it 
is in conflict with the s¥gatantive due process limitations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. ~ 
Another category which has reflected the culture of the 
period ha.a been that ot hippie. Not the same as vagrant, the 
status, nevertheless, has been subjected to similar laws and judg-
ments. Two cases between 1962 and 1970 have made BQaiarum rele-
vant to oases about punishing hippiea, 
In an action under the Civil Rights Act, Hughes v. Rizzo, 
282 1. Supp. 881(1968), the district court heldt 
••• our criminal laws are directed toward actione not status. 
Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660(1962) 1 · It 1• not a crime to be a 'hippie' and the police could not iawtullJ' ~at on 
the basis ot suspicion, or even probable cause to 'believe, tha1 
the urestee oecy~4ea the status of being a homoauual or 
narcotic addict. · 
After that inclusive, it illogical, pronouncement on the 
range of freedom or status provided by R,Qb~nsgp., there was a 1969 
case which reached the same conclusion. Broughton v. Brewer, 298 
F. Supp. 260(1969) 1 declared an Alabama vagrancy statute, which 
had been invoked against hippie loitering, was ao vague that it 
163Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897(1969). 
164.nughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 884(1968). 
violated due process ot law. However, a request tor an injunction 
against future arrest under the same statute was denied. RQ.RiUIRJl 
was not e::::tended to the granting of that injunction where prosecu-
tion had not taken plaoe, but was "merely threatened.n 165 
Then, a fifth category of status, mental illness, has been 
cited frequentl.7 1.n the tradition of Bal>t.MPn•· N•ar1Y synonymous 
with narcotic addiction in many cases subsequ•nt to the Supreme 
Court decision, mental. illneea was not a status which bad been 
punished by criminal ata.tut••• However• th• ca.sea have sought to 
prove that indirect]J the tonclition was the contNlling tor-ee in 
behavior which was )>Uld.8he4. 
In Sas v. State ot Maz7la.nd1 334 F. Zd 5()6(1964) 1 Circuit 
Judge J. Spencer Bell Mviewed the h1ato27 of the law and etatus 
cases. 
Care, however, ahoul4 'M taken to read these caMa in the light 
of the Courtts more no•nt deo18ions beginning With Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 11.s. 6,'2(192,) 1 in which the Court has broadened the coneept ot liberty con't81ned in the toupteenth amendment 
and thus has bl"Ought te ~ on th• states the constitutional 
requirement ot fundamental fairness contained in many sections 
ot thf 6~111 ot Righta net theretofore thought to apply to 
them. 
In u.s. ex rel. Kessler v. Fay• 232 F. Supp. 139(1964) 1 a 
petition for a writ ot habeas corpus based on mental illness was 
denied; but, the possible relationship of RqqinlQD was established. 
The justification of the petition was acknowledged. 
16~roughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 270(1969). 
l66.sas v. State or Maryland, 334 F. 2d 516(1964). 
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To be sure, the fact that he was one• a mental incompetent and 
an incessant user ot narcotics thereafter does not, in and of 
itself, establish that he was insane at vital periods, but is 
certainly probative on the basic issue and is sufficient to 167 repel any suggestion that his claim was made ot whole cloth. 
Then, 1n Sweeney v. u.s •• 353 F. 2d 10(1965) 1 the prece-
dent or RQb4DiRD was used to combine alcoholism and involuntary 
b•haV1or to constitute a status which should not have been pun-
ished.168 
More consistently related to i9l21.nssu11 the case ot Rouse v. 
Gameron• 373 F. 2d. 451(1966}, argued that n1ndetin1te oontinement 
without treatment ot one who has beentound not criminally respon• 
sible may be so inhuma.ne as to be 'cruel and unusual puueh• 
ment.•n169 
. 
Tb.en, in Collins v. Cameron1 377 F. 2d. 945(1967)• an appeal 
ot a district court ruling ordering hospital eornmitment, Circuit 
Judge Burger stated: "Nothing in Robinson, or Easter, 1mpin5es in 
any way on our holdings ••• being found not guilty 'by ~son ot 
insanity on a oha.rge of second-degFee murder. 01 7° 
Correspondingly, there was a rejection or RQld,>umn as a 
basis tor alleging that a mental patient•s.extended. jail sentence 
167u.s. ex rel. Kessler v. Fay, 232 r. Supp,. 11+1(1964). 
168sweeney v. u.s., 353 r. 2d 11(1965). 
l69Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F. 2d 4530966). 
l?OOollins v. Cameron, 3?7 F. 2d 947(1967). 
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was cruel and um1i:.mal punishment in Roberts v. rr.s. • 391 F. 2d 991 
(1968). 171 
Similar to Rouse v. Cameron, 37.3 F. 2d 451(1966), the ease 
of u.s. ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1071(1969), dis-
cussed the right to treatment while confined. Lack of ~edical 
attention was said to be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment; 
RQR*D§.OD waa cited as p~•c•d•nt. 1 72 
Finally, the last category of status which has boen said 
to be within the scope of RQRi1m1 has been that of so-called sex 
offender. One case betwffn 1962 and 1970 has been tried in the 
district court ot the Western D1rt•1on of Pennsylvania and appealec 
. 
to the Third Circuit+ tJ • s. ex Ml• Gercbman v. 1-ia.roney 1 235 F. 
Supp. 588(1964) 1 the distnot court ca., upheld the Barr-Walker 
Act because it had. not "authorized or imposed punishment for the 
condi tio:i1 of a person W1 thin Pennsylvania." l 73 The opinion con-
tinued to say that it tb4t Act had punished status, then it would 
have been in violation ot the Fourteenth Amendment as provid&d in 
Rqb;j.JlSQ.Gt 174 
When the appeal Of U,S. ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, .355 F. 
2d 302(1966)• was affirmed with an opportunity for the district 
court to retey the case within 60 days, the rertson for the decision 
1'?1 Rober.ta v. u,s •• 391 F. 2~ 992(1968). 
172u.s. ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1088(1969). 
l73u.s. ex rel. Gerehman v. Maroney1 235 F. Supp. 594(1964)~ 
174n1d. 
was lower court denial of procedural due process. Reterenoe to 
BgbiDaqn was a footnote which indicated the eonst:ltT:tional basis 
of conside:t:'ing the Pennsylvania atatute. 175 
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The second trend indicated by decisions citing B2ntnsQn 
has been the exten$10n ot the doctrine or incorporation. Throueh 
the expansion ot the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment to the states through the due process 
clause or the Fourteenth Amendment• BQ:Qinegn has been an example oJ 
the progress toward applying the first ten Amendttents to the United 
. 
States Qg;gtUuiiln to the states. 
BIJliDi.ttl has been cited in cases which have sought to d., 
velop the three phrases of the Eighth ~:ndment. Bes1.des the pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment• the prohibitions 
against excessive bail and excessive fines have bffn eited. 'l'he 
death penalty hae been said to be cruel and unusual punishment in 
this time. Also, unfair procedures in prisons and racially-moti-
vated. punishment ot conVieted persons have been said to be within 
the prohibition given in llDiD'ln• 
Mentioned in five landmark Supreme Court eases and in three 
lower court cases in the federal courts between 1962 and 1970, 
Rn'h-t ""c""'"' has been reeognized to be on• ot the chain ot opinions 
175u.s. ex rel, Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F. 2d 308(1966). 
which brought the first eight ot the l\.m.endments t;o the $tates 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth At1f.mdrr.ent. 
Bet;irurl.ng with Gideon v, Wainwright• 373 n.s. 342(1962), 
Which provided tor the eongtitlrtional right to counsel 1::1 state 
criminal trie.ls. RQh;i.;ilQ.Il was ei ted in suppo.r-t or the crow1.nt;; 
understandine ot the states• rights in terms of the tir.st ten 
Amendments. 
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In his opin1.on for the Conrt, Hr. Justice Black developed 
the theme. Progressins t1u"'ou.gh the Fourth and Fitth L"tlendme11ts, 
he said: "though not always in precisely the same terminology, 
the Court has made obligatol'y on the Sta.tea ••• the Eighth's ban 
on cruel and unusual pl.tnishment.tt 176 At that point, then was a 
footnote citing BQb:tnen1• 
Then* in Malloy v, Hogan, 378 u.s. 6(1963), when Mr. 
J".lstice Brennan delivered the opinion of' the Court, he included an 
extensive footnote concerning the Eighth Amendment. Following a 
citation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 u. s. 342(1962), he recom-
mended: 
See also Robinson v. Calitorn1a1 370 u.s. 660(1962) 1 which despite lt1 re Kamler, 136 u.s. 436; HcElvain• v. Brush_, 142 
U.S. 155; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, matle applicable to 
the Sta.tea t;,7Eighth Amend.ment;a ban on oruel a.nd unusual punishments. 
·----............. "'1 .. ....... 
t76Gideon v. W~nwr1ght, 372 u.s. 342(1962). 
t77~ialloy v. Hogan, 378 u.s. 6, rn. 6(1964). 
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Next, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 488(1964), Mr. 
Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice 
Brennan, wrote a separate concurring opinion which noted BqJa~asm 
as precedent fol" the application ot the Eighth Amendment. 
'l'his Court, in a series ot decisions,. bas h•ld that the 
Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those 
epecitios of the first t1§ht amendments Which express tunda ... 
mental personal rights. 
Again, Mt>. Justice Goldberg concurred. in a aepaJ-ate opinion 
in Pointer v. Texas, 380 u.s. 412(1964), which cited it1N.DIRD to 
explain that "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition ot Ol'Uel and 
unusual punishm.ents"179 was one ot "the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees against 1ntr1ngement"by the States.n180 
Recently, the Supreme Court case, Duncan v. Louiaiana• 391 
u.s. 145(1968), contained a tootnote Which relegated the etgniti-
cance of BotaJ119n to striVing tor incorporation. Commenting upon 
the novelty of the cases which accomplished the inCO.l'JO~ationt the 
reference observed that "recent eases applying provisions of the 
first eight Amendments to the States represent a new approach to 
the 'incorporation• debate,." 181 
Following were th!'ee lower federal court oases which stated 
that iQy~m;w. had brought the cruel e.nd unusual punishment clause 
l78Griewold v. Connect1out, 381 u.s. 488(1964). 
l79Pointer v. Texas, .:580 u.s. 411(1964). 
180lb2.41 
l81Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 u.s. 149(1968). 
ot the Eighth Amendment to the states thl"ough the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Two of these were Hobson v. 
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401(1967), a school integration suit, and 
Green v. Board ot Bl•ctions of the City ot New York, '80 :r. 24 445 
(196?). 
Also, in the ease ot v.s. ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 410 :r. 
24 1088(1969)• the emphasis oontinued to be plaeed on the extensior: 
ot the Bill of Rights to the states. Al though a status issue was 
involved in the petition tor a wit of habeas corpus filed on be-
half of an inmate ot thit Dann•mora State Hospital, Dannemora. New 
York1 the eitation ot ltld.llPD 1!4• a footnote abOut its .role in 
ineoll"p0rat1ng the Eighth Amendment. 182 
In. addition to th• atension ot the Eighth Amendment, the 
development of the acepe of its pl'Ovild..ons has been eneouraged 
through oases which have :Nlied on Bala2'A8Ul• 'i'h• pPOhibition 
against denial ot bail hae b-.n .read into the prohibition against 
excessive bail. However• the application ot the B@l?lDma ruling 
has not reversed~ opiniona,of that kind. 
u.s. ex rel. Prirttera .,., ltroea, 239 F. Supp. 118(1965), 
contai.ned a ruling by District Jud.g• Weinfeld of the Southern Dist ... 
rict of New York, which held that it was not cruel an.4 unusual to 
182u.s. ex rel. Bruno v, Herold, 410 F. 2d 1088(1969). 
183u.s. ex rel. Privite~ v. Kross, 2'9 :r. Supp. 118(1965). 
impose excessive bail With imprisonment as an alternative if the 
accused were unable to raise the amount.t83 
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Kelly v. Seboontield, 285 F. Supp. 732(1968), was an action 
by city jail prisoners who alleged that '•confinement tor nonpayment 
of tines and costs was unconatitutional."184 However, the Maryland 
District Court held that the statutes which }.Jl'Ovided tor the eon-
finement were constitutional. 185 Furthermore, tn an unusual com-
mentary on the meaning of iQJainMXh the Court ob...,... that the 
prisoners had committed. crtmes1 and• they were not dia.ased. 186 
11.s. ex rel. Siegel v. Follett•• 290 F. Supp. 632(1968}, 
was a group of "petitions tw habeas corpus seeking release trom 
~tate prison pending appeal ot ~onvictions." 187 The pttitiona 
were den1-1 on the grounds that the "burden ot presenting tacts to 
support a finding of arbitrary denial ot ba11n188 waa net met. The 
opinion did state that the right to bail should be reapected to the 
extent that the Eighth Amend-.nt had been made relevant to the 
states by BGiiRIOB•189 
Besides cases whioh ext•nd~ the prohibitions against levy-. 
ing exceuive bail and excessive tines, there have b•n oases whieh 
18
-'u.s. ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 r, Supp. 118(1965). 
l84xelly v. Scboontield1 28; F. Supp. 7'2(1968). 
185xai4 •• 133. 186Il.}is •• 135. 
l87u.s. ex rel. Siegal v. Follette, 290 r. Supp. 632(1968). 
1881;i&,, 635· 189IhiA1 
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presented particular instances of punishment that were said to be 
cruel and unusual. Irregularities in court procedures and in 
sentencing were protested. 
The case of U.S. ex rel. Kaganovitch v. Wilkins, 305 F. 2d 
715(1962) 1 held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishments was applicable to the states.t90 
Nevertheless, the Court ot Appeals affirmed a district court denial 
ot a writ of habeas corpus; because, the defendant had not applied 
to the Supreme Court tor certiorari to review the state court 
decisions., 191 
More speeitically denyi~g claims ot "cruel and inhumane 
treatment01 92 were u.s. v. Vita, 209 F,, Supp. 172(1962), and u.s. 
ex rel. Bryant v. Fay, 211 r. Supp. 812(1962). 
Then, two 1963 eases applied RQs~nson to determine that 
unfair punishments had not been invoked. U.S. v. Hendrick, 218 F. 
Supp. 293(1963), stated that the punishment had not been dispropor-
tionate to the offense. Hyser v. Reed, 31 B F. 2d 22lf( 1963) • held 
that parole had not been revoked unjustly. 
Both G~d•2n and Boblnsgn were applied to Perkins v. State 
ot North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333(1964); Perkins was ordered 
"released within 60 days unless the State should elect to try him 
again." 193 
l90u.s. ex rel. Kaganovitch v. Wilkins, 305 F. 2d 715(196.2) 
191Xbi4i 192u.s. v. Vita, 209 F. Supp. 174(1962}. 
l93Perk1ns v. St. of North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333(1964). 
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A second 1964 habeas corpus proceeding, Goss v. Bomar, 337 
F. 2d 341(1964), was not successful. The petitioner had not ex-
hausted his state remedies. Nevertheless, the appropriateness ot 
raising the issue of whether a "life sentence without possibility 
of parole under the Tennessee Habitual Crimin~l Statute violated 
the Eighth Amendment to the tederal Const1tutionn194 wns shown to 
be free of doubt left by Gr~.ham v. West Virginia, 2.2L1- U.S. 616 
(1912) 1 as a result ot the action taken 1.n.Rob1nSQJl· 195 
Also accepting the Supreme Court decision as precedent, the 
ease of u.s. ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F. 2d 844(1965), 
granted an appeal tor a habeas corpus proceeding under c1v11 
~ 
remedy proceedings. 
However, in Sturm v. California Adult Authority, 395 F. 2d 
446(1967), the court affirmed a lower court ruling against grant-
ing a writ ot habeas corpus. The California Adult Authority was 
said to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the length ot time 
to be served when indeterminate sentences had been ordered. 
A particular torm ot punishment has been said to be pro-
hibited by ,Ro..blnsgn. That iG the death penalty. It was the 
primary issue in four cases between 1962 and 1970 whic~ cited the 
Eighth Amendment. Although the death penalty waa not removed from 
use, it has been threatened by the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
l94aosa v. Bomar, 337 r 2d 341(1964). 
195Xbif.d,,1 342. 
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Whether the Eighth Amendment applied to the death penalty 
was asked in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 u.s. 889(1963). The Court 
denied certiorari; although, Mr. Justice Goldberg, who was joined 
by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented Vigorously. 
Citing Weems v. u.s., 217 U.S. Jtt,9(1909), and referring to 
Bczbinggu, the justices asked1 "does the imposition ot the death 
penalty tor rape constitute •unnecessary cruelty•tn196 The 
question followed anotherl 
Can the permissible aims of punishment(e.g., deterrence, 
isolation, rehabilitation) be aehieved as effectively by 
puniehing rar 18Sf9"8Verely than by death(8•8•t by life 
impriaenment ••• 
R~eating the same question, Jackson v. Diokaont '25 F. 2d 
575( 1963) 1 decided Decuh1ber 30, two months after 11&4al'ai1 also 
affirmed the imposition of the death penalty tor a person tound 
responsible not only to:r rape, but also tor mu:rder. 198 However, 
in the opinion, Judge Duni~ speculated "that it anything in the 
CnnAt1.tutinn forbids the penalty, it muat be the lighth Amend-
ment.tt 199 The r•aaoning was direoted away from the death penalty 
to the question of status. 
Does the imposition ot the death penalty und•r these cir-
cumstances constitute cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth .Amendmentst Jackson asserts 
that it does. His primary reliance is on Robinaon v. Calif-
ornia, 370 u.s. 660 ••• The State ot California did not sen-
196Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 u.s. 889, tn. 7(1963). 
197'12:2.Jli l98Jackson v. Dickson, 325 F. 2d 573(1963). 
1991W1u ;75. 
tence Jackson to death2a5cause he was mentally 111. It sen-tenced hi.m tor murder. 
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Again, in Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760(1968), the 
death penalty was not held to be cruel and unusual punishment. 
However, the applicability of RQb~ll§.OD to the issue was credited. 
Finally, the mo.st recent example of a ease which r'ai.sed 
the issue of the death penalty was settled in the manner in which 
the earlier ones were decided. In Sims v. Eyman, 405 F. 2d 439 
(1969), the opinion was that under current law, the death penalty 
was not oruel and unusual punishment. 201 
Similar to the cases which challenged unfair sentences, 
there have been others which have been lodged by inmates seeking 
to remedy prison conditions and treatment employed. In most of 
the cases of this nature between 1962 and 1970, the convicted have 
rejected particular regulations and codes practiced by prison of-
ficials. 
Two cas&s decided in the United States District Court tor 
the Northern District ot Illinois, Eastern Division, by Judge Will 
immediately as$erted the Rgb4nsgn findings. In Redding v. Pate, 
220 F. Supp. 124(1963), the opinion commented upon alleged 
t•1ntentional deprivation ot essential medical care. u202 
The alleged facts probably constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning ot the Eighth Amendment. In 
light of this, it is perhaps fair to assume that Judge Lindley 
did not rely on the Eighth Amendment because as the law stood 
2001b14, 201 s1ms v. Eyman, 405 F. 2d 447(1969). 
202Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124(1963). 
then(1948), the Supreme Court had never, !a3so many words, sanctioned its application to the States. 
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Generously viewing the parameters of RQRin§S}n, Judge Will 
said that "the cases ma.k.e it clear that the concept of 'cruel and 
unusual punishment' is broad and ela.stic. 0204 
Again, quoting V.ir. Justice Douglas, in u.s. ex rel. Hancoc~ 
v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202(1963), Judge Will asked whether "the use 
ot the sanction against a prisoner who acted in self-defense, to 
borrow language from Mr,. Justice Douglas. was a punishment out ot 
all proportion to the offense so as to bring it within the ban 
against cruel and unusual punishment?n205 
However, the Tenth Circuit decision of Kostal v. Tinsley, 
337 F. 2d 845(1964), did not so broadly interpret Rcb;t,nson. Placine 
a prisoner in solitary confinement attar he had attempted to escapE 
was not oonsidered to be cruel and unusual punishment.206 
A year later, an Arkansas District Court trom the Eastern 
District• Pine Bluff Division, in Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 
687(1965) 1 did grant an "injunction restraining authorities0207 
from the use of 0 corporal punishment"~g~ 0 an infliction of cruel 
and unusual punishment.n209 
205u.s. ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 205(1963). 
206Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F. 2d 845(1964). 
207Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683(1965). 
208'.J:b:J.<l•, 209:tli;W .. , 687. 
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In I-iandman v. Peyton• 370 F. 2.d 135(1966) • the United 
States Court ot Appeals tor the Fourth 01l."cuit affirmed a decision 
by tht Eastern District of Virginia at Richmond. Supporting the 
"uae of tear gas approximately 12 to 15 times in the course ot a 
year in a Virginia p.rison,"210 Judges Haynsworth, Sobelof'f and 
Bryan ruled that these were legitimate exerci•s ot disciplinary 
authority. 'l'he placement ot prisoner Landman "ih solitary confine-
ment tor violation of a regulation prohibiting imaates against 
using, tor scrap, legal papers supplied by the pen1tentiaryn211 was 
permissible, too. 
\fnght v. McMann1 257 F. Supp. ?39(1966)4 387 F. 24 519 ~ 
(1967), anothei- prisoner's motion protesting sol1\a.J7 oentinement, 
was dismissed f'irst on detendant•s motion. 212 Then, the Civil 
Rights aotton was reversed and J>emanded in a lateli" 1967 appeai.213 
The &IWJlan principle was reinforced by an. earlier d.tation &om 
'l'rop v,, Dulles, 356 u.s. 86(1958)1 '*Th• Eighth Amendaht torbids 
tr.atment so foul• ao inhuman and so violative of balri.o concepts 
ot decency."21 4 
.Al.GO dil'ect-4 against the practice ot solita.17 confinement 
210tandman v. Peyton, 370 F. 2d 135(1966). 
211 tta.si •. 
212wr1ght v. McMa.nn1 257 i\ Supp. 739( 1966) • 
21
-"wright v •. McMann, 387 F. 2d 520( 1967)• 
214i1Wlt.. 526. 
ot prisoners, Jordan v. F1tzha.rris1 2.57 F. Supp. 674(1966), pro-
duced an "injunction permanently restraining prison authori-
ties. "2. l 5 
Emerging from the Ea.stern District ot Arkansas where 
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 845(1964) 1 had S9cured an injunc-
tion ~gainst corporal punishment, Jackson v. Bishop• 268 F. Supp. 
804(1967), was an.other case requesti.ng that prison otf'ioials be 
ordered to desist trom physically abusing prison•rs. Although 
Bob'Q'oll was cited, Judges Oren Harris and Gordon B., Young doubted. 
that the use ot the strap would be cruel and unusual punishment. 
In order to 1-emove the possibility ot a misuse et the punishment, 
. 
the judges devised an elaborate p:rocedure requiring adnd rd strati ve 
reYiew.216 
Then, in 19681 the tendency to acknowledge th• 1:1.ghth 
Amendment, but to deny that any action involving a petitioner had 
b .. n cruel and unusual punishment, continued in Konigsberg v. 
Ciccone, Z85 F. Supp. 5(1968). 
Treatment of prisoner in a medical center, inoludtng alleged 
beating when he resisted search ot his person, his confine-
ment to strip cell, and inspection of his p$rsttn tor contra-
tand by nonmedical administrazf'e persons. did not constitute 
eruel and inhuman punishment. 
21 5Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674(1966). 
21 6Jaokson v. Bishop,. 268 F. Supp. 805(1967). 
21 7Kon1gsberg v. Ciccone, 285 r. Supp. 5(1968). 
However, the prisoner was granted the right to attend 
Jewish religious services.21 8 
The second 1968 case against prison ottieials, Burns v. 
6; 
Swenson, 288 F. Supp. 4(1968), was a hearing of a number of com.-
plaints by prisoners in a m.'lXimum security unit. The grievances 
concerning abridgment of constitutional rights 1Nl'f! ordered to be 
resubmitted through revised standards of the Mlasouri department 
ot eorreotions.219 
Oecurring a third tL"ne in 1969, the case ot Bolt v .. Sarver1 
330 F. Sl.1.pp. 825( 1969), was an action by state :Pl'i••r• in the 
Eastern District of Arkansas11ho claimed that alitarJ eon.tine-
. 
ment and substandard cells nre ib violation of oonatituttonal 
rights. An orda granting declaratory judgment and 1njunc.t1ve 
relief was based on iabjngqa+ The punishment was ~ against 
"concepts of decency and human dignity and precepte •t •1v1lt.za-
t1ons wld.oh Aaericans profess to posaess,n220 
Also protesting the use of solitary contintlaent, Hanooek 
v. Avery1 301 r. Supp. ?86(1969), established that it was cruel an: 
unusual to ignore •'the fundamental concepts of 4••••• "221 
Quoting BsiPiDson in the text, the case reattirmed the applicabili t: 
of the Eighth Amendment prohibitton at,!:ainst cruel and unusual 
punishment to anlitary confinement. 
21 8tB:LS1 21 9Burns v. Swflmaon1 288 F,. Supp. 5(1968). 
22.0Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 826(1969). 
221 Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786(1969). 
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In ti. special area of complatnts from prison inmates were 
those alleging racially-motivated punishment. Two cases protested 
actions 1n Alabama prisons. 
Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327(1966), granted 
"declaratory and injunctive relief concerning racial segregation 
in the state pGnal system and in county, city and town ja.ils.n222 
Beard v. Lee, 396 F. 2d ?49(1968), upheld an allegation of 
cruel and unusual punishment on racial grounds.223 The case con-
sidered BaQi;aa 1n its finding. 
Tb.roughout the ea.see which extended the scope ot &iQinfiSm, 
there have been issues concerned with the provisions of the Eighth 
~ 
Amendment. The ramifications ot these eases have bdn decisions 
about the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment and about the 
Possible implications ot those prohibitions. Although inconsis-
tent, the opinions ot the federal courts have stretched tl1• cruel 
and unusual punishments clause to include exeassiv• bail and tines, 
. 
untail" sentenc:1.ng procedures1 and harsh prison conditions. There 
has bee:r1 indication that even the death peualty may o•• to be 
eonside~ within the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment sill 
222waab1ngton v. Lee, 263 r. Supp. 327(1966). 
223 Beard v. Lee, 396 F. 2d 749(1968). 
IV 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT FEDERAL COURT PERCEPTION 
AND INTERPRETATION OF R0Bi:tl€QI 
In contrast to its broad scope and diverse ramifications, 
Bo~~n§S'?n has been interpreted narrowly in the federal courts be-
tween 1962 and 1970. Rather than seeking ways to bring the de-
cision to comparable questions before them, justices in both fed-
eral 'district and circuit courts ot appeals have shown reluctance 
even to accept the principle that a state law which punishes 
status is unconstitutional. 
An explanation for the response by the federal court 
system to Robinson has resulted trom observation ot the 349 tederaJ 
and state court cases whieh have cited the Supreme Court decision. 
The opinions have reflected especially elose reading ot the entire 
majority opinion ot the Supreme Court and ot the concurring 
opini~n of Mr. Justice Douglas. 
In the opinion of the Court, the new application of the 
Eighth .Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
was balanced by reassurance that state's rights were not infringed. 
The right to penalize unwanted behavior was established before the 
protection of status was imposed. These provisions tor exceptions 
to the decision were central to the reasoning. Later courts 
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utilized the alternatives to the holding to evade the fundamental 
principle of RQ9iD§S2ll• 
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Douglas• concurring opinion was 
frequently quoted. Seized enthusiastically by sponsors of re-
habilitation who condemned prison terms for persons convicted of 
crimes of status, the text also was lamented by advocates of severe 
penalties for criminals. While the opinion apparently was written 
to insure the humane attitude of courts toward man in whatever 
condition he was, the dramatic presentation was thought by law 
enforcement advocates to be "brimful of what Learned Hand once 
called the •watery sentiment that obstructs, delays and defeats 
~ 
the prosecution of crime.•«224 
Consequently, the roots of the later decisions which 
perceived and interpreted Robiusgn have been drawn trom the 
Supreme Court decision itself. It is possible that the develop-
ment of the case and its influence have recorded correctly the 
sentiments ot the eight Supreme Court justices who manifested the 
national feeling at that time. Reflecting the need to press the 
Eighth Amendment into current service, the justices alao indicated 
the hesitancy or conservative factions to push the new understand-
ing too tar and too soon. Therefore, the impact on later cases 
has mirrored the guarded, ambivalent ruling in the Supreme Court. 
224Joseph w. Bishop Jr. "The Warren Court Is Not Likely 
To Be Overruled," Ht! Ygrk ~Lmes Magazi;e, September ? 1 19691 p. 92.. 
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From the earliest stages in the California state courts, 
the question of the appropriateness of the Eighth Amendment had 
been raised carefully. That caution permitted flexibility which 
has weakened substantially the force ot Robinson. Through pro-
cedural and subtle, diversionary methods, the lower federal court 
judges have avoided reaching decisions which supported or enlarged 
the Supreme Court decision. 
Generally, procedural tactics have been used to refuse to 
hear petitions for writs of habeas corpus submitted by prisoners 
serving convictions for laws similar to the California statute, 
Section 11721 ot the California Health and Safety Code, or tor pre-
. 
Robi!J!son sentences tor violation of that very law. 
Those cases have not been decided on the merita of the 
issue raised, but on the more basic question of standing in the 
federal court system. Opinions which declared that the petitioners 
had not exhausted their state court remedies have f:ruatrated the 
progress of the law with respect to crimes of statue. 
In addition to procedural grounds• the decieiona have been 
reached often in terms of the protective role of the federal courts 
toward the state courts. Justice Stewart•s concluding statement in 
the majority opinion has prompted the federal court judges in two 
cases. at least. Connecticut and Louisiana statutes which punished 
addiction have not been considered to be affected by the "individ-
70 
ual provision of a particularized local law as it has so far been 
interpreted by the California courts.n225 
Also, confinement of Robinson has been accomplished through 
reasoning about the actions performed instead of the condition of 
the person. Weighed against a charge of a brutal physical. act, a 
plea for not sentencing on the basis of involuntary status has 
been inconsequential. 
Mentioned in connection with Mr. Justice Douglas• opinion, 
an alternative approach to the dilemma of involuntary status and 
criminal action has been the use ot rehabilitative measures for the 
convicted. Instead of punishing wrong behavior, some of the lower 
court justices have ordered treatreent of the persons through sen-
tences in hospitals. Through cooperation or the medical profession• 
expert testimony has been introduced to show that the accused 
were incompetent. 
Handling status issues by passing the responsibility for 
judging to physicians has not been successful in all cases, however~ 
Some of the persons who had been treated more humanely by being 
confined in mental institutions have sought legal aid to be trans-
ferred to penal institutions. Although the public may ha.ve been 
convinced that spending time in a hosp1t·e1 was an example of pro-
gressive jurisprudence, the recipients of that theory have not 
been fooled. 
225Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 668(1962). 
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Lon L. Fuller, in Anatomy of the Law, revealed the faulty 
assumption made by judges who have given opinions which have 
rendered men ill rather than wrong. 
Do men in fact feel less shame in being f oraally declared to 
be functioning badly than they do in being found to have 
broken the rules? One perceptive observer has remarked that 
it is more of an affront to human dignity to sub~~it a man to 
compulsory .improvement than it is to punish him. 
When the federal court justices have written opinions 
which purportedly did not punish status, but assigned indetermin-
ate confinement in institutions, they have been employing the 
"variety of valid forms," 227 which included na program of compul-
sory treatment"228 that "might ,.require periods of involuntary 
confinement 11 "229 outlined by Mr. Justice Stewart. 
That "penal sanctions might be imposed for failure to 
comply with established compulsory treatment procedure"230 has 
been a suggestion followed by federal courts, also. Construing 
petitions from persons sentenced originally under unconstitutional 
laws to be invalid because of violations of probation has been 
questionable 11 but not challenged, however. 
Another example of the variations in dealing with 
Robinson has been the stressing of the duty of Congress to repeal 
laws and to rewrite old ones when necessary. The possible cruelty 
226Lon L. Fuller. Anatomy of the Law(Washington: 
Praeger, )968), 31. 
227Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66~()962). 
228Ibid. 11 665. 229tbid. 
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of sentencing a mother of minor, dependent children to five years 
in prison for a first offense in a narcotics arrest has been 
rationalized by a court which said that its duty is to administer 
the laws that Congress has written in the Narcotic Control Act. 
Robinson has not been accepted as an overridi~g principle. 
Whenever an alternative to freeing a peraon accused of a 
crime of status has been visible, the federal courts have taken 
that option. The basis for their ingenuity has been the majority 
opinion and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas. Aware-
ness of possible rejection by later courts and by the people in 
general caused the five justic~s to agree on an extensively rea-
soned decision. Mr. Justice Douglas tried to reinforce that 
opinion. 
Having anticipated the objections, the Supreme Court 
justices prepared complex opinions with explicit ways to escape 
the simple rule of Robinson. Through this study of decisional 
impact and constitutional development, it has been indicated that 
greater adherence to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment would have been necessary to consis-
tent federal and state court decisions since 1962 in cases involv-
ing questions of status if Robinson had been less conciliatory anc 
more direct. 
In conclusion, the Robinson case has been a means by which 
the complex system of interaction among the United States courts 
has been explored. By following one case from its beginning in 
73 
the state and federal courts through its decision in the Supreae 
Court and impact on lower federal and $tate courts, the process of 
interpretation, growth and reinterpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment has been observed. 
The study has emphasized that one Supreme Court decision 
is neither the first nor the last opinion on a contemporary issue 
before the nation. The research has shown that legal decision-
making involves reaction to precedent as well as action on new 
problems in a vital communication between the judges, who are 
formulating opinions, and the people within this constitutional 
government. 
v 
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